Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

Florentino Portero Rodríguez
the Taliban forces is somewhat fictitious. They are not the same, but
they are closely linked. Al-Qaeda is no longer a centralised organisation,
and therefore it is not as important as it was six years ago to strike its
leaders and commanders in hiding at the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. If the Taliban return to power al-Qaeda will again have a
command and control base and a training centre. The setting of the date
for withdrawal immediately before the next presidential polls reveals one
of the goals of the current Administration with a view to the election: to
present themselves as being responsible for there being no US troops on
battlefields: Bush started conflicts, Obama ends them. While we do not
doubt the effect of this discourse on the presidential elections—which will
coincide with a complete renewal of the House of Representatives, onethird
of the Senate and a good many posts in the states—it is not clear
whether, in Afghanistan, the necessary institutional development, stemming
of corruption and containment of the insurgency to guarantee the
stability of the current political regime can be achieved within such a short
space of time. The White House has repeatedly stated that the setting of
a withdrawal date stems from the need to pressure Karzai’s government
into hastening the implementation of the necessary reforms. Even if this
argument is true, it is extremely risky. In fact, it may be having the opposite
effect to that intended.
Many Afghans, whether from the Taliban world or otherwise, may
think that by setting a date for pulling out its forces the United States is
announcing its withdrawal from the country, its abandonment of its ally
Karzai and acceptance of its defeat. Many clan chiefs will believe the time
has come to reach an understanding with the Taliban, thereby undermining
the political regime’s possibilities of taking root. This is exactly what
General McChrystal viewed in his widely disseminated report as the main
hindrance to stabilising Afghanistan. The population have shown over the
years that they do not want to return to living under a fanatic Islamist dictatorship,
but if they become convinced that the United States is pulling
out they will be forced to come to an arrangement with the future rulers
as soon as possible in order to preserve their lives and property. Should
this trend be confirmed, we would be up against a problem with very
serious consequences for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and which will
furthermore influence the decisions that NATO member states have to
make on the effect of the new US strategy on their own missions. If the
burden of containing the Taliban forces is going to be handed over to the
Afghan army within a year and a half and if responsibility for training its
units falls to the NATO member states, we will have to take into account
— 119 —