Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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Florentino Portero Rodríguez<br />
An organisation set up to solve problems often becomes no more than<br />
a blocking mechanism of a great power that seeks to legitimise a particular<br />
action. The General Assembly is often used to criticise the United States,<br />
Israel and Europe. On many occasions the Security Council has been a<br />
witness to American attempts, on occasions backed by European states,<br />
to carry forward resolutions that justify the use of force, with very mixed<br />
results. This markedly anti-western tone is due to these other nations’<br />
need to legitimise their own acts in law. As democracies they love law<br />
and make it the framework for their acts. Both times the United States<br />
invaded Iraq it sought a resolution justifying the invasion, with unequal<br />
and never fully satisfactory results. On the contrary, states which operate<br />
outside the democratic sphere do not feel the need to seek a legitimacy<br />
which they regard as inherent in the defence of national interests. It never<br />
crossed Russia’s mind to ask the Security Council to authorise it to invade<br />
and occupy Georgia. Nor have its recent threats about the future of<br />
Crimea gone through the Council. It is paradoxical that democratic states<br />
should feel the need to seek backing for actions approved by democratic<br />
procedures from organisations—such as the Security Council—that are<br />
deeply antidemocratic in both their makeup and their voting system. It is a<br />
consequence of respect for law extrapolated beyond civil society.<br />
The inaction of the Security Council as a consequence of the exercise, or<br />
mere threat, of the right of veto has simply resulted in the action in question<br />
being performed outside its area of influence. The threat of a Russian veto<br />
with respect to the Kosovo crisis did not prevent the campaign of air strikes<br />
that ended with the retreat of the Serbian troops and eventually the defeat<br />
of Milosevic himself. The Franco-Russian manoeuvre to prevent the invasion<br />
of Iraq did not paralyse the military operations; it damaged the United<br />
States’ international image but at the cost of drawing attention to the powerlessness<br />
of its rivals. The US troops have gained control of the country,<br />
albeit with difficulty, but nothing remains of the Franco-Russian agreement.<br />
The Security Council allows showdowns between the great powers, but in<br />
the end it is the one that truly is great which asserts its authority.<br />
The Security Council needs to embark on a thorough overhaul in the<br />
short and medium term. Even if it succeeds, the overhaul will probably be<br />
less drastic than necessary. At best the Council will be able to carry on<br />
playing its highly useful role as a meeting point where the major powers<br />
can exchange information and attempt to bring their positions closer together.<br />
A low-key but very important function. What the Council will never be<br />
is a world government or a democratic organisation. The price of having<br />
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