Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the 2010 NPT review conference irreversible breakdown of the international non-proliferation regime embodied by the NPT (8). At the end of 2009 neither have all issues been settled nor do there cease to be serious threats looming on the horizon. However, owing largely to the new proposals put forward by the Obama Administration, several problems are being steered along a new path and an opportunity is arising to resume and strengthen multilateral cooperation in this field. The outlook for the 2010 NPT Conference is much more encouraging, as transpired from the 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee (and from many of the statements issued at the meeting of the First Disarmament and International Security Council at the 64th session of the United Nations General Assembly in October 2009). On the last day of the PrepCom the five nuclear powers issued a joint statement reaffirming their collective support for the NPT and undertaking to seize the opportunity provided by the 2010 Review Conference to preserve and reinforce international confidence in the Treaty and ensure a satisfactory and balanced review. In her testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Ambassador Susan F. Burk, Special Representative of President Obama for the NPT, referred to the May 2010 conference as a «critical milestone in the [nonproliferation] regime» and explained in detail the Obama Administration’s aims for ensuring a balanced review process that shores up the NPT (9). The Statement on Non-proliferation adopted by the G8 on 8 July 2009 at the L’Aquila (Italy) summit also recognised that the NPT continues to be the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The signatories reiterated their «full commitment to the objectives and obligations of its three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament» and undertook to «work together so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty’s regime and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars». They likewise «call upon all States Parties to the NPT to contribute to the review process with a constructive and balanced approach» (10). (8) AGUIRRE DE CÁRCER, Miguel, Las propuestas de la administración Obama frente a los restos del desarme nuclear y la no proliferación, Working Paper 46/2009 (21 September 2009), Real Instituto Elcano, pp. 3-4, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/7c8b2 b804fa877f5a072ff8bf7fc5c91/DT46-2009_ Aguirre_de_Carcer_Obama_desarme_nuclear_ no_proliferacion.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=7c8b2b804fa877f5a072ff8bf7fc5c91. (9) Ibid., p. 20. (10) http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/2._LAquila_Statement_on_Non_proliferation.pdf, para. 2. — 184 —
Vicente Garrido Rebolledo Nevertheless, the starting point of the 2010 Conference is that any progress in non-proliferation must go hand in hand with significant progress in the field of disarmament in order for the NPT to retain its credibility in the future. In this connection Barack Obama’s advent to the White House has marked an important turning point with respect to George W. Bush, especially if we consider that the new Administration has launched numerous nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation proposals which have led to the unblocking of some international initiatives and agreements. Some examples of the foregoing are the signing of a new START Treaty with the Russian Federation (scheduled for the end of 2009) on the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals, the negotiation of which has in turn been made possible by a substantial change in the architecture of the US missile shield (which initially involved stationing a ground radar on Czech territory and ten laser missile interceptors in Poland); the ratification of the CTBT; and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT or Fissban). THE WHY AND WHEREFORE OF A NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY Although the idea of nuclear non-proliferation began to be considered in 1961, the term itself was not coined until four years later following the start of negotiations on the NPT. It was initially based on the statistical danger nuclear proliferation posed: on the one hand, the possibility that a nuclear war could also increase the number of states in possession of nuclear weapons; and on the other, concern about the devastating effects of an accidental launch of these weapons by the US or USSR (11). Following the explosion of China’s first uranium 235-based nuclear bomb on 16 October 1964 (contrary to all calculations) (12), the other four nuclear states (the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France, in order of access to nuclear weapons) began to be aware of the problem posed by an increasing number of countries possessing nuclear weapons and of the need to set a limit, by means of political and diplo- (11) For a detailed analysis of the negotiations and contents of the NPT see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, Vicente, El régimen de no proliferación nuclear: participación e implicaciones para España, doctoral thesis, Servicio de publicaciones de la UCM, Madrid, 1995 (1032 pp.). (12) One of the most complete studies on the history of nuclear energy and the political motivations of states in relation to their access to nuclear weapons is GOLDSCHMIDT, Bertrand, The Atomic Complex. A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 1982. — 185 —
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MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA SPANISH INSTI
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DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INSTITUTION
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INTRODUCTION
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Introduction II The economic crisis
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THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND ITS IMPACT
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Federico Steinberg Whesler CHART 3
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CHAPTER TWO CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS
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Climate change and its security imp
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CHAPTER THREE INTERNATIONAL RELATIO
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International relations and the new
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THE AF PAK SCENARIO Jo s é Ma r í
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