Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the 2010 NPT review conference State TABLE I World Nuclear Arsenals (November 2009) Strategic Nuclear Weapons Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Total (Strategic + Tactical) USA 2.126 500 2.623 (+2.577 res. + 4.200 d.) = 9.400 Russia 2.668 2.050 (5.390 ?) 4.718 (+8.282 r/d)↓ = 13.000 China 176? Deployed ? 240 ? ↑ 25% increase in arsenal since 2005 France 300 0 300 (Mirage 2000N /ASMP + Super Étendard /ASMP + SLBMs M45) United Kingdom 200→160 0 160 (renewal SLBMs (Trident) decided on by Parliament on 14/6/2007) + 10/15? = 180-185 Israel 80-200? ? 170? 80 operational India 60? ? 60-80? 60 operational↑ Pakistan 60? ? 70-90? ↑ 60 operational↑ North Korea 5-12? PU ? ? reserves TOTAL ~23.360* Res. = nuclear warheads in reserve; d = nuclear warheads withdrawn, awaiting decommissioning. * The estimated total number of nuclear weapons manufactured since 1945 worldwide amounts to over 128,000 warheads, 98 percent of which were built by the US (55% or 70,000 warheads) and the USSR (43 percent or 55,000 nuclear warheads). Source: Compiled by the author from data published in the «Nuclear Notebook: Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009», The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 6, November-December 2009, pp. 86-98, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/ xm38g50653435657/fulltext.pdf. — 196 —
Vicente Garrido Rebolledo to the IAEA by adopting concrete sanctions against Iraq that amounted to backing the NPT even though two of its permanent members, France and China, had not yet signed the Treaty. In what might be regarded as the other side of the coin, many argue that the Treaty has been unable to prevent some States Parties from benefiting precisely from their non-nuclear-power status to acquire a nuclear military capability through transfers of products and technologies from other countries, whether or not Parties to the Treaty, under the guise of technologies for exclusively civilian purposes (in addition to Iraq and Libya in the 1980s, Iran in the early 1990s). As a result of the debate—and, in particular, following the discovery of Iraq’s secret nuclear programme (which, despite the US’s accusations, the IAEA stated to have been fully decommissioned in 1993) (30)—efforts were stepped up to stem nuclear proliferation by strengthening the IAEA safeguard system to prevent similar cases from going undetected in the future. After several years of talks, in 1997 the new enhanced system of safeguards was adopted. Set out in a «Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements for the Application of Safeguards» (INFCIRC/540), under the name of «comprehensive safeguards», the system reinforces the organisation’s powers of verification by encompassing the whole cycle of nuclear production (uranium mines, nuclear materials, waste and installations). The Protocol, ratification of which was non-compulsory (it was not signed by Iran), allows inspectors access to all nuclear facilities and infrastructures in a country, guaranteeing fuller knowledge of the activities it is carrying out (even through the collection of environmental samples) and identifying more clearly any possible diversion of nuclear materials. THE REVIEW CONFERENCES OF 1995 AND 2000 AS THE BASIS OF THE DISARMAMENT AGENDA Another of the particular features of the NPT lay in the fact that it was not a treaty of indefinite duration. Initially concluded for a 25-year period, (30) The report submitted by the Director General of the IAEA to the United Nations Security Council on 27 June 1998 (S/1998/684) stated that «there are no indications of Iraq having achieved its programme’s goal of producing nuclear weapons», «most of the IAEA activities involving the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of the components of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme […]were completed by the end of 1992» and «there are no indications of Iraq having retained any physical capability for the indigenous production of weapon-usable nuclear material». — 197 —
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MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA SPANISH INSTI
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DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INSTITUTION
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INTRODUCTION
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Introduction included a chapter on
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Introduction To this end he propose
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Introduction II The economic crisis
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Introduction The authors go on to e
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Introduction The next question aske
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Introduction truly representative d
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Introduction Indeed, the insurgency
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Introduction exercises its influenc
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Introduction security of Europe»;
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Introduction them; as India stated,
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Introduction 4. Negotiation of new
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THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND ITS IMPACT
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Federico Steinberg Whesler to Europ
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Federico Steinberg Whesler CHART 3
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CHAPTER TWO CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS
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Climate change and its security imp
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CHAPTER THREE INTERNATIONAL RELATIO
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International relations and the new
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THE AF PAK SCENARIO Jo s é Ma r í
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José María Robles Fraga dingly, t
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José María Robles Fraga From now
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José María Robles Fraga dangerous
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Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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