Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

The AF PAK scenario
kept on trying to seek a «strategic depth» in Afghanistan by supporting the
Afghan factions and groups it judged to be closest and most favourable to
its interests, even if this contradicted and endangered the western intervention
in Afghanistan. After all, this was what it had done in the past—first
helping part of the anti-Soviet resistance that inspired greatest confidence,
then Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during the civil war and, finally, the Taliban
themselves, who would never have established their regime and defeated
the other armed groups without Pakistan’s support and help. The Taliban
originated from the madrasahs at the border, gradually became an army
that won the civil war thanks to Pakistani soldiers and even today have as
their most trusty allies the country’s Islamist and Jihadist groups.
In his memoir («In the Line of Fire») Musharraf himself even develops
the concept of the difference between good Jihadist and evil terrorist in a
manner that is highly revealing of the complexities of Pakistan’s position
on these matters.
That is why we need to put Pakistan in its right place in the AF-PAK
puzzle and, at such a critical moment, call for the means, interest and political
will to establish a common European position and consistent western
stance including a strategy towards Pakistan that is more than just a footnote
quotation or an occasional reference in documents on Afghanistan.
In other words, it is necessary to devote attention to this difficult and
complex country that was once defined as the «most dangerous in the
world», where an essential battle also needs to be fought and won against
the Taliban and Jihadism.
In September 2001 Pakistan was the Taliban regime’s main ally and
support. Since then, following the forced volte-face of the then President
Musharraf, Pakistani politics have been conditioned by the situation in
Afghanistan and relations with the United States, as well as by the traditional
alternation between military dictators and weak civilian governments—described
by author Zahid Hussain as «the Pakistani soap opera
of alternation between authoritarian rule by an elected government and
authoritarian rule by a self-appointed leader from the army»—and a persistent
strategic ambiguity.
Pakistan thus has the unsettling status of being an ally as important
as it is unreliable. The Islamabad security establishment has constantly
been playing a double game in its dealings with our Afghan and Jihadist
enemies. In addition to irking its western allies and donors, this double
dealing has ended up confusing the entire population and further hampe-
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