Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

The AF PAK scenario
THE AFGHAN SITUATION
Backsliding on the commitments acquired by the West before the
international community is unthinkable in Obama’s plan, despite the deterioration
in the security situation, western frustration and the doubts and
rejection of the Afghan people owing to widespread corruption at all levels,
the election fraud and the incompetence of their rulers.
Nonetheless, by no means can we compare the weariness of the western
public with the Afghans’ sentiments about what is happing to them.
They continue to be favourable to the presence of foreign troops but this
feeling is now accompanied by fear of the return of the Taliban, weariness
of this endless war and frustration at the hardship of daily life.
Despite the announced increases neither are there presently nor will there
be enough foreign troops to control the whole of Afghan territory unless the
Afghan army is capable of deploying within a reasonable period, operating by
itself or with western support and withstanding the attacks of the insurgents.
Basically, more soldiers are needed on the ground, although this in itself is
no doubt insufficient to reverse the deterioration in security levels. In 2008
34% more armed clashes, nearly 37% more deaths of ISAF troops and 50%
more civilian casualties were reported. Throughout 2008 there were more
casualties in Afghanistan than in Iraq, while a growing number of districts fell
into the hands of the various insurgent groups: Taliban commanded by the
Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network and Hekmatyar’s Hiz-e-islami, above all.
Even districts of the north and west, far from the Durand Line which separates
Afghanistan from Pakistan and from Pashtu areas, have witnessed an
increase in attacks and the presence of insurgents.
Although in March 2009, when still a candidate, Obama spoke of
a «civilian surge» as a novel element of the Democratic alternative in
Afghanistan, the fact is that there is little to be done in this respect under
the current security conditions. These conditions have worsened even in
Kabul, whose security is now the responsibility of the Afghan army, and
have led to the evacuation—in principle provisional—of part of the UN’s
expatriate personnel. The arrival and deployment of hundreds of US voluntary
workers and technicians in Afghanistan to promote economic and
social development and start up infrastructure projects is unthinkable, as
the risk level is still unacceptable. On the contrary, if progress were made
on the security front these projects could very well accompany a new
counterinsurgency strategy that sought the consensus of the population
and an improvement in their living conditions.
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