Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

Vicente Garrido Rebolledo
nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA safeguards, namely Israel, India and
Pakistan—which remain reluctant to do so to this day).
The second priority was the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as
proliferation seriously increases the danger of a nuclear war. «Every effort
should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,
without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties
to the Treaty».
The third was to achieve nuclear disarmament in a broad sense. The
nuclear-weapon states reaffirmed their commitment, as stated in article VI
of the NPT, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating
to nuclear disarmament. To ensure the full and effective enforcement
of this article an action plan was adopted (constituting the essence of the
decision on the P&Os), based in turn on five progressive measures beginning
with the negotiation and entry into force of a Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996 (finally adopted on 10 September
1996 but not yet in force owing, among other things, to the failure of the
United States, Israel, India and Pakistan to ratify it (34)). As of December
2009, the CTBT had been signed by 181 states and ratified by 150 (31
of the 44 states necessary for the definitive entry into force of the Treaty
have signed but not yet ratified it). The second priority was the immediate
commencement of negotiations leading to the prompt adoption of a nondiscriminatory
and universally applicable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices (FMCT or Fissban)(35). Lastly, a commitment
was sought from the five de iure nuclear-weapon states (P-5) to make systematic
and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with
the ultimate goal of completely eliminating them, and to promote general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
(34) On the CTBT see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Pruebas Nucleares: Punto y final» in
Anuario del CIP 1996-1997, Icaria, Barcelona, 1997, pp. 347-359.
(35) «Fissionable» refers to any material with atoms capable of undergoing nuclear fission.
«Fissile» applies to materials which are fissionable by neutrons with zero kinetic energy.
«Fissile» is thus more restrictive than «fissionable»—although all fissile materials are fissionable,
not all fissionable materials are fissile. Uranium-238 (U-238) is fissionable but
not fissile. Neutrons produced by fission of U-235 have an energy of around 1 MeV (100
TJ/kg, i.e. a speed of 14.000 km/s) and cannot fission U-238, but neutrons produced
by deuterium-tritium fusion have an energy of 14.1 MeV (1400 TJ/kg, i.e. a speed of
52,000 km/s) and can effectively fission uranium-238 and other non-fissile actinides. The
neutrons produced by this fission are again not fast enough to produce new fissions, so
U-238 does not sustain a chain reaction.
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