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Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the <strong>2010</strong> NPT review conference<br />

However, the Obama Administration’s new approach to the North Korean<br />

nuclear issue differs substantially from that of the Bush Administration.<br />

For example, despite North Korea’s announcement in November <strong>2009</strong><br />

that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods and had<br />

accomplished «Noticeable successes […] in turning the extracted plutonium<br />

weapon-grade for the purpose of bolstering up the nuclear deterrent»<br />

(in violation of its own denuclearisation commitments and several<br />

UN Security Council resolutions), the US has not adopted any sanctions,<br />

stating that «Washington is only focused on achieving «a comprehensive<br />

peaceful solution to the<br />

As for Iran, the Obama Administration’s official line is also diametrically<br />

opposite to that of its predecessor. Barack Obama stated at Prague<br />

that «Iran has yet to build a nuclear weapon. My administration will seek<br />

engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We<br />

believe in dialogue. But in that dialogue we will present a clear choice. We<br />

want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations, politically<br />

and economically. We will support Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy<br />

with rigorous inspections. That’s a path that the Islamic Republic can take.<br />

Or the government can choose increased isolation, international pressure,<br />

and a potential nuclear arms race in the region that will increase insecurity<br />

for all.»<br />

Nevertheless, the course of events has led this discourse, which was<br />

initially optimistic about the Iranian nuclear crisis (in his address to Cairo<br />

University on 4 June <strong>2009</strong>, President Obama reiterated his willingness to<br />

the Iranian leaders and people to «move forward without preconditions on<br />

the basis of mutual respect») to become more realistic. Indeed, pressure<br />

on Iran and a more favourable attitude on the part of the US towards the<br />

implementation of stricter sanctions has become more evident following<br />

the discovery in September <strong>2009</strong> of a second underground pilot uranium<br />

enrichment plant not previously declared to the IAEA in Qom, which,<br />

according to the organisation, «does not contribute to the building of confidence»<br />

(61).<br />

On 15 December <strong>2009</strong>, the US House of Representatives approved<br />

by overwhelming majority new sanctions against Iran and companies that<br />

do business with its government as a punishment for failing to suspend<br />

(61) Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security<br />

Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the<br />

Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General of the IAEA, GOV/<strong>2009</strong>/74, 16<br />

November <strong>2009</strong>.<br />

— 214 —

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