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Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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Vicente Garrido Rebolledo<br />

(uprezhdayushchiy udar) and even against an adversary not possessing<br />

nuclear weapons (negative security assurances)(71).<br />

Finally, China’s official policy on nuclear no-first-use, negative security<br />

assurances and other commitments in nuclear weapons control is<br />

currently more symbolic than real, as it is practically impossible to verify<br />

commitments in these fields. China has never clearly articulated a nuclear<br />

doctrine on the deployment and response capability of its nuclear arsenal,<br />

although both its activities and its programmes (on the basis of the scant<br />

information available) indicate that Beijing only possesses a few limited<br />

options regarding the utilisation of nuclear weapons. Nor does it appear to<br />

be clear how the nuclear no-first-use policy can be maintained, especially<br />

if it undermines China’s deterrence capability, a fundamental element of<br />

its nuclear doctrine.<br />

Lastly, the seventh priority on the new non-proliferation agenda is to<br />

prevent terrorism with weapons of mass destruction (not only nuclear).<br />

This brings us to the need to adopt a series of measures that are absolutely<br />

essential, such as the improvement of facilities and physical protection<br />

of nuclear materials. In this respect it is important to stress some<br />

important advances such as the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety<br />

and Security of Radioactive Sources and the implementation of Security<br />

Council Resolution 1540, but it would be necessary to promote universal<br />

accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear<br />

Material, among other measures. As stated earlier, the convening by the<br />

US of a World Summit on Physical Nuclear Security three weeks before<br />

the holding of the NPT Review Conference may be a good time to reflect<br />

on this possible «fourth pillar of non-proliferation», but, we stress, it should<br />

not be used as a pretext to divert attention from the rest of the substantial<br />

issues of the NPT.<br />

Many pending issues that are not easy to solve undoubtedly remain on<br />

this «list of good intentions» – such as how to guarantee the universality of<br />

the NPT (that is, how to secure the accession of India, Pakistan and Israel,<br />

which are highly reluctant to join). Pakistan considers that nuclear weapons<br />

are its most valuable strategic asset and, ultimately, guarantee the existence<br />

of the nation vis-à-vis what is considered to be the threat of India. As a<br />

Pakistani general stated in a widely disseminated article, «Oxygen is basic<br />

to life, and one does not debate its desirability, the «nuclear deterrence»<br />

(71) «New Russian doctrine and preventive nuclear strikes» in Russian strategic nuclear forces,<br />

http://russianforces.org/blog/<strong>2009</strong>/10/new_russian_doctrine_and_preve.shtml.<br />

— 221 —

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