Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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Vicente Garrido Rebolledo<br />
(uprezhdayushchiy udar) and even against an adversary not possessing<br />
nuclear weapons (negative security assurances)(71).<br />
Finally, China’s official policy on nuclear no-first-use, negative security<br />
assurances and other commitments in nuclear weapons control is<br />
currently more symbolic than real, as it is practically impossible to verify<br />
commitments in these fields. China has never clearly articulated a nuclear<br />
doctrine on the deployment and response capability of its nuclear arsenal,<br />
although both its activities and its programmes (on the basis of the scant<br />
information available) indicate that Beijing only possesses a few limited<br />
options regarding the utilisation of nuclear weapons. Nor does it appear to<br />
be clear how the nuclear no-first-use policy can be maintained, especially<br />
if it undermines China’s deterrence capability, a fundamental element of<br />
its nuclear doctrine.<br />
Lastly, the seventh priority on the new non-proliferation agenda is to<br />
prevent terrorism with weapons of mass destruction (not only nuclear).<br />
This brings us to the need to adopt a series of measures that are absolutely<br />
essential, such as the improvement of facilities and physical protection<br />
of nuclear materials. In this respect it is important to stress some<br />
important advances such as the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety<br />
and Security of Radioactive Sources and the implementation of Security<br />
Council Resolution 1540, but it would be necessary to promote universal<br />
accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear<br />
Material, among other measures. As stated earlier, the convening by the<br />
US of a World Summit on Physical Nuclear Security three weeks before<br />
the holding of the NPT Review Conference may be a good time to reflect<br />
on this possible «fourth pillar of non-proliferation», but, we stress, it should<br />
not be used as a pretext to divert attention from the rest of the substantial<br />
issues of the NPT.<br />
Many pending issues that are not easy to solve undoubtedly remain on<br />
this «list of good intentions» – such as how to guarantee the universality of<br />
the NPT (that is, how to secure the accession of India, Pakistan and Israel,<br />
which are highly reluctant to join). Pakistan considers that nuclear weapons<br />
are its most valuable strategic asset and, ultimately, guarantee the existence<br />
of the nation vis-à-vis what is considered to be the threat of India. As a<br />
Pakistani general stated in a widely disseminated article, «Oxygen is basic<br />
to life, and one does not debate its desirability, the «nuclear deterrence»<br />
(71) «New Russian doctrine and preventive nuclear strikes» in Russian strategic nuclear forces,<br />
http://russianforces.org/blog/<strong>2009</strong>/10/new_russian_doctrine_and_preve.shtml.<br />
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