Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

José María Robles Fraga
dangerous than ever. Pulling out of Afghanistan would not only end up ruining
the country and plunging it into another civil war but would endanger
the whole of central Asia, beginning with Pakistan and India.
Changes in European and American opinions and the logical impatience
of the allied governments will be a hard test of the United States’
leadership and its ability to keep the coalition united and prevent premature
unilateral withdrawals. For the first time in a history that began on 11
September 2001, it will be forced to deliver winning results and a strategy
with realistic goals and timeframes aimed at alleviating the political
and military burden of the Afghan commitment in the foreseeable future.
It is difficult to establish a final time limit, but it is necessary to lay the
groundwork for a radical change of trend in Afghanistan in the decisive
year 2011.
NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE
Since the Korean and Vietnam wars it has been common practice for
the US media to raise the debate on the definition of military success and
on the best way of reaching the point at which the troops can be sent
home as soon as possible. However, the history of Afghanistan has shown
that such a victory is always elusive there and that the most to which we
can aspire is an arrangement or a balance that suits our interests, even in
the knowledge that the Afghans’ ability to break any agreement and capacity
for discord are more than notable and continuous. We would have to
categorically deny that Afghanistan is a tomb of empires but at the same
time remember that all the powers which have had some involvement in
the region have had serious difficulties coping with and limiting damage
to their interests and objectives as a result of their proximity or dealings
with Afghan tribes.
It is therefore advisable to start defining what we want to achieve,
which is tantamount to stating why we have made the huge commitment
of sending troops and generously spending taxpayers’ money in a place
so remote from our traditional spheres of action. I assume that, beyond
the rhetoric and United Nations lingo, there is sufficient consensus that
we would settle for reaching an equilibrium in which a stable Kabul government
backed by the international community could guarantee the minimum
security of its territory and deny al-Qaeda and its allies the possibility
of using Afghan soil for its global terrorist enterprise.
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