Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

The AF PAK scenario
lar response or at least one that adapts to and does not contradict
President Obama’s determination to correct the mistakes of the Bush
Administration and the shortfalls of previous years. This is the necessary
and just war proclaimed at the time by the then candidate in contrast to
that of Iraq, the main crime of which, according to the present analysis,
was to divert resources and attention away from that of Afghanistan
which, unlike Iraq, was inevitable following the attacks of 11 September.
In 2002 haste was made to proclaim what proved not to be such a
victory as the leadership of al-Qaeda and the Taliban had survived and
carried on fighting while regrouping in the border areas of Afghanistan
and, above all, Pakistan.
Many of the European partners who applauded this discourse must
now accept the consequences—which are not only rhetorical—of those
words and will find it extremely difficult to escape the overwhelming logic
of the political consensus built at up the time concerning the need to go
to Afghanistan and fight al-Qaeda and its allies there, even though public
opinions at the time were considerably concerned about the course events
were taking in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Withdrawal is impossible and it will be necessary to follow US leadership.
It would therefore be a good thing to go further than merely formulating
general objectives or even debating on what kind of result we want
in national terms. What is required is to contribute in this decisive year to
reviewing and adapting civilian and military contingents and the particular
strategies and tactics of each of the partners and allies.
It is not a bad idea to take reality as a starting point for formulating
these intentions. This calls for banishing the idea of building an impossible
state that is a far cry from the traditions and particular characteristics
of Afghan politics in which tribal, ethnic and clanship ties and remoteness
and mistrust of the central power hold more weight than any other
considerations that we might regard as more significant. Dire poverty
(Afghanistan is the fourth poorest country in the world), corruption and the
historical weakness of the central government are by no means negligible
factors, to which is added the legacy of thirty years of civil war, guerrilla
warfare and foreign intervention—of which ours is simply the most recent
example.
We run something of a risk of presenting this new proposal for action
and this major political and military impulse as the West’s last opportunity
to consolidate an Afghanistan free from the Taliban menace and, accor-
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