Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

José María Robles Fraga
dingly, to deny Bin Laden and his followers victory against the world’s
Great Satan which, if not achieved, would lead us to withdraw, once
again abandoning the Afghan people to their terrible fate. It is as if this
were the last battle in a war which we have resigned ourselves to losing if
this last attempt does not turn out well with right and reason on our side
and for every good reason in the book. And this is a grave danger, even
if only because in order to stand a reasonable chance of winning and
not to abandon this land to chaos and civil strife again there is nothing
more contagious among Afghans than the idea that we are departing and
that it will only be a matter of time before another victor comes through
the gates and bazaars of Kabul and Kandahar. The consideration of a
timeframe for troop withdrawal cannot, under any circumstances, signify
ceasing to be responsible for the viability of an Afghanistan whose fragility
and fragmentation will require the international community’s constant and
permanent attention. President Obama’s proposal and the subsequent
clarifications thus entail both a timescale and a general commitment to
non-abandonment.
This strategy must therefore include different options and variants
based on the consideration that, as we have proclaimed at all European,
Atlantic and United Nations forums, we are determined to honour a lasting
commitment with no expiry date.
From these elections has emerged a Karzai, twice delegitimized in his
own country and discredited in western eyes, who needs to address and
solve the internal political problem highlighted by the worryingly low election
turnout of the Pashtu population (only 8% are reported to have voted
in the so-called «Pashtu belt»)—namely the disaffection of Afghan’s largest
minority. This is an important fact—which, incidentally, is incessantly
pointed out by neighbouring Pakistan and should not be underestimated
as unless Karzai soon recovers the support he once commanded from
part of the Pashtu ethnic group it will hardly be possible to speak of a
stable Afghanistan or a strong government in Kabul. It is not just Karzai’s
political survival that is at stake—perhaps even the future possibility of
there being a united Afghanistan.
Pakistan is now also emerging as one of the keys to stabilising
Afghanistan, as not only are its tribal areas home to a sort of reconstructed
Taliban mini state but it is also a significant regional actor and the main
player in a quarrel with India that is even older than the Afghan conflict and
is spreading its poison to the whole region.
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