Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the 2010 NPT review conference on how to address the proliferation challenges posed by some countries, especially Iran. All this, according to Samore, will bring a series of benefits to US national security, which will be essential to enabling the Obama Administration to secure the political support it needs from Congress and other domestic interlocutors to be able to bring to fruition its new vision of these issues. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed on 28 October 2009, referring to «the next steps on non-proliferation», that «no nation is safe from the threat of nuclear proliferation, and no nation can meet this challenge alone. […] That is why the United States has launched a major diplomatic effort to forge a renewed international consensus on non-proliferation» (57). However, all this brings us to a more significant debate based on the future of the role of nuclear weapons in the security strategies of the two foremost powers (and, by extension, of China, France and also the United Kingdom, which decided in 2007 to renew many of the missiles of its Trident submarine fleet). However, it should not be forgotten that existing world nuclear arsenals number more than 23,000 warheads and that others (fortunately not many) have the technology to produce nuclear weapons. There is a widespread perception (especially in the US) that the efforts made by the international community to date to prevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea (58) and Iran (59) have failed miserably. In the first case, despite the agreement reached on 13 February 2007 to denuclearise North Korea (see the contents of the action plan in Table II), hopes of the (57) CLINTON, Hillary, «The Next Steps on Nonproliferation», Foreign Policy, 28 October 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/28/the_next_steps_on_nonproliferation. (58) For a detailed analysis of the origin and development of the nuclear programme, see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Corea del Norte: Entre el Desarme y el Rearme Nuclear», Tiempo de Paz, núm. 32-33, Madrid, spring-summer 1994, pp. 104-113; «La situación nuclear en Asia: ¿cuál es el atractivo del arma nuclear?» in Asia, escenario de los desequilibrios mundiales, Seminario de Investigación para la Paz, Centro Pignatelly (ed.), Zaragoza, 2000, pp. 227-264; «La crisis nuclear norcoreana: conflicto nuclear y trascendencia en la región asiática» in OJEDA, A., Hidalgo, A. and LAURENTIS, E. (eds.), Corea: tradición y modernidad, Ed. Verbum, Madrid, 2004, pp. 141-166. on the contents of the Framework Agreement, see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Corea del Norte: El último glaciar de la guerra fría», Tiempo de Paz, no. 37, Madrid, spring-summer 1996, pp. 28-39. (59) For an analysis of the origin and development of the Iranian nuclear programme, see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «El programa nuclear iraní y las dificultades para visitar a los amigos», Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales (REEI), No. 12/2006, http:// www.reei.org/reei%2012/GarridoRebollero(reei12).pdf. — 212 —
Vicente Garrido Rebolledo country putting an end to its military nuclear programme and returning to the NPT (as a non-nuclear state) seem far off for the time being. Indeed, one of the first crises President Obama has had to address is precisely the nuclear crisis with North Korea stemming particularly from the second nuclear test conducted on 25 May 2009 and followed by several ballistic missile tests. TABLE II NORTH KOREA – DENUCLEARISATION ACTION PLAN (60) • The agreement is to be implemented in a phased manner based on the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, following the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks. • The plan is progressive («action for action») and consists of different phases, the ultimate goal of which is to achieve early denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner in accordance with the commitments made by the Parties in the Joint Statement. • The agreement of 13 February consists of an initial, 60-day phase of «action» and a subsequent phase of «disablement». • During the initial 60-day phase the Parties undertake as follows: – North Korea will shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility, allow international inspections and supply a list of all its nuclear programmes to the other parties to the Six-Part Talks ; – the other parties will provide an initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. If the provisions laid down for the initial stage are fulfilled, a further 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil will be provided; – five working groups will be set up and will meet over the next 30 days. These groups will focus on denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, normalisation of US-North Korea relations, normalisation of Japan-North Korea relations, economic and energy cooperation and the establishment of a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism; – in the framework of the US and North Korea working group, the countries will hold meetings aimed at settling «pending bilateral issues» and moving towards full diplomatic relations; – The United States will also examine the situation of North Korea on its list of states that sponsor terrorism. – o Once the initial actions have been implemented, the six parties will hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means of promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia. – o The parties reaffirm that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust and will make joint efforts to achieve peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. (60) The full text of the agreement in English can be found at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2007/february/80479.htm. parece que el link ya no está — 213 —
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MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA SPANISH INSTI
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DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INSTITUTION
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INTRODUCTION
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Introduction included a chapter on
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Introduction To this end he propose
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Introduction II The economic crisis
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Introduction The next question aske
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Introduction Indeed, the insurgency
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Introduction exercises its influenc
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Introduction security of Europe»;
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Introduction them; as India stated,
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Introduction 4. Negotiation of new
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THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND ITS IMPACT
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Federico Steinberg Whesler to Europ
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Federico Steinberg Whesler CHART 3
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Federico Steinberg Whesler This new
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CHAPTER TWO CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS
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Climate change and its security imp
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CHAPTER THREE INTERNATIONAL RELATIO
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International relations and the new
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THE AF PAK SCENARIO Jo s é Ma r í
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José María Robles Fraga From now
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José María Robles Fraga dangerous
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José María Robles Fraga populatio
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José María Robles Fraga ring the
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José María Robles Fraga coalition
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THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE COMMON
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Aníbal Villalba Fernández as HR w
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