Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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The global recession and its impact on international economic relations<br />
Although it is impossible to determine with accuracy the optimum time<br />
for withdrawing the stimuli, there is a certain amount of agreement on the<br />
need to maintain them at least until the middle of <strong>2010</strong> (or until there is<br />
evidence that recovery is firmly underway). There also appears to be consensus<br />
on the need to withdraw fiscal stimulus before monetary stimulus<br />
(just as fiscal stimulus was implemented after it became clear that monetary<br />
stimulus was insufficient to reactivate the economy) (2). Therefore, it is<br />
possible that the countries with the highest growth rates will adopt counteractive<br />
budgets in 2011 (3). However, it should be borne in mind that<br />
fiscal policy poses the problem of a time lag that is difficult to determine<br />
between the moment the government decides to withdraw spending and<br />
the moment when the contraction hits the real economy. Therefore, if the<br />
delay is too long, it could cause inflationary pressure to force the central<br />
bank to raise interest rates before public expenditure begins to decrease.<br />
But despite these question marks hovering over when to withdraw<br />
discretionary fiscal stimulus and how to calculate the size of the time lag,<br />
the alternative—to begin with monetary contraction—has even greater<br />
problems. The main one is that if interest rates were raised, the cost of<br />
financing for businesses and families would increase, hampering recovery.<br />
Furthermore, higher interest rates would mean a greater cost of public<br />
debt, making it more difficult to put public accounts in order.<br />
It therefore seems that the combination of a contractive fiscal policy<br />
and an expansive monetary policy is better for economic growth than a<br />
situation where contraction comes from the monetary side. A lax monetary<br />
policy will thus be able to carry on stimulating investment projects once<br />
the easing of discretionary public spending has taken place, provided that<br />
inflationary pressure allows this and the financial system is functioning<br />
relatively normally.<br />
Deficit, debt and future growth<br />
Even assuming that the authorities are capable of designing effective<br />
exit strategies that are relatively well coordinated internationally and that<br />
there will be a return to growth, this crisis has left a gaping hole in public<br />
coffers that will have to be closed. As charts 3 and 4 show, in <strong>2010</strong> all<br />
(2) For a more detailed explanation see Clara Crespo «Estrategias de salida tras la cumbre<br />
del G-20». Analysis 139/<strong>2009</strong> of the Real Instituto Elcano<br />
(3) At any rate no government wishes to repeat the mistake made by the Roosevelt<br />
Administration in 1937 when, believing that the Great Depression was over, it approved a<br />
tax increase that again crippled growth until the beginning of the Second World War.<br />
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