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Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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Vicente Garrido Rebolledo<br />

in the development of his country’s nuclear programme, proposed that a<br />

distinction be drawn between vertical nuclear proliferation for the first case<br />

and horizontal nuclear proliferation for the second.<br />

India referred constantly to the acquisition of atomic weapons by<br />

established nuclear states as «vertical», «de facto», «existing», «actual»,<br />

«continued» or «real» proliferation, and to non-nuclear states’ option of<br />

going nuclear as «horizontal», «additional», «future», «possible» or «likely»<br />

proliferation. In India’s view, vertical nuclear proliferation was the direct<br />

cause of horizontal nuclear proliferation: the growing acquisition of nuclear<br />

weapons by the nuclear powers had a direct impact on states that did not<br />

possess them as it threatened their security. Therefore, India (as one of the<br />

leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement) stated that the NPT should crack<br />

down on the proliferation of all forms of acquisition of nuclear weapons,<br />

including vertical proliferation (that is, an increase in the number of nuclear<br />

warheads of states already possessing nuclear weapons or even the technical<br />

enhancement of these arsenals) instead of focusing solely on horizontal<br />

proliferation (15), as advocated by the United States and the Soviet<br />

Union in their respective treaty drafts (16).<br />

Indeed, the USSR had its own draft treaty, submitted to the United<br />

Nations General Assembly at the end of 1965, establishing a total ban on<br />

the manufacture, possession, control or use of nuclear weapons by any<br />

non-nuclear state. Moscow made it clear during the debates held at the<br />

UN that the real aim of the project for an Atlantic nuclear force proposed<br />

by Washington was to supply nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic<br />

of Germany. During the secret talks held at the end of 1966 between US<br />

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko,<br />

Washington relinquished the idea of setting up a multilateral nuclear force<br />

but, in exchange, Moscow agreed to the presence of US nuclear weapons<br />

on the territory of US allies and did not object to consultations between the<br />

latter on the possible use of weapons of this kind—that is, to the establishment<br />

of a Nuclear Planning Committee within NATO (17).<br />

(15) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Guía para entender la política nuclear de India» Papeles de<br />

Cuestiones Internacionales, No. 59-60, CIP, Madrid, December 1996, pp. 37-42.<br />

(16) Document of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament ENDC/<br />

PV. 223. On the positions of other states see SCHÖTTLE, Enid, Postures for Non-<br />

Proliferation. Arms Limitation and Security Policies to Minimize Nuclear Proliferation,<br />

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Taylor & Francis Ltd., London,<br />

1979.<br />

(17) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «El futuro del desarme y la no proliferación», Política<br />

Exterior, No. 105, May-June 2005, pp. 93-101.<br />

— 187 —

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