Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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Vicente Garrido Rebolledo<br />
in the development of his country’s nuclear programme, proposed that a<br />
distinction be drawn between vertical nuclear proliferation for the first case<br />
and horizontal nuclear proliferation for the second.<br />
India referred constantly to the acquisition of atomic weapons by<br />
established nuclear states as «vertical», «de facto», «existing», «actual»,<br />
«continued» or «real» proliferation, and to non-nuclear states’ option of<br />
going nuclear as «horizontal», «additional», «future», «possible» or «likely»<br />
proliferation. In India’s view, vertical nuclear proliferation was the direct<br />
cause of horizontal nuclear proliferation: the growing acquisition of nuclear<br />
weapons by the nuclear powers had a direct impact on states that did not<br />
possess them as it threatened their security. Therefore, India (as one of the<br />
leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement) stated that the NPT should crack<br />
down on the proliferation of all forms of acquisition of nuclear weapons,<br />
including vertical proliferation (that is, an increase in the number of nuclear<br />
warheads of states already possessing nuclear weapons or even the technical<br />
enhancement of these arsenals) instead of focusing solely on horizontal<br />
proliferation (15), as advocated by the United States and the Soviet<br />
Union in their respective treaty drafts (16).<br />
Indeed, the USSR had its own draft treaty, submitted to the United<br />
Nations General Assembly at the end of 1965, establishing a total ban on<br />
the manufacture, possession, control or use of nuclear weapons by any<br />
non-nuclear state. Moscow made it clear during the debates held at the<br />
UN that the real aim of the project for an Atlantic nuclear force proposed<br />
by Washington was to supply nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic<br />
of Germany. During the secret talks held at the end of 1966 between US<br />
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko,<br />
Washington relinquished the idea of setting up a multilateral nuclear force<br />
but, in exchange, Moscow agreed to the presence of US nuclear weapons<br />
on the territory of US allies and did not object to consultations between the<br />
latter on the possible use of weapons of this kind—that is, to the establishment<br />
of a Nuclear Planning Committee within NATO (17).<br />
(15) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Guía para entender la política nuclear de India» Papeles de<br />
Cuestiones Internacionales, No. 59-60, CIP, Madrid, December 1996, pp. 37-42.<br />
(16) Document of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament ENDC/<br />
PV. 223. On the positions of other states see SCHÖTTLE, Enid, Postures for Non-<br />
Proliferation. Arms Limitation and Security Policies to Minimize Nuclear Proliferation,<br />
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Taylor & Francis Ltd., London,<br />
1979.<br />
(17) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «El futuro del desarme y la no proliferación», Política<br />
Exterior, No. 105, May-June 2005, pp. 93-101.<br />
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