Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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Vicente Garrido Rebolledo<br />
In fourth place, as a logical consequence of the foregoing, the negotiation<br />
of new nuclear disarmament accords between the US and Russia<br />
(such as the aforementioned renewal of the START Treaty), but without dismissing<br />
the possibility of involving the three other de iure nuclear powers<br />
in the process, especially China. Beijing has stated on several occasions<br />
that it would be willing to cut back its nuclear arsenal (it should be borne in<br />
mind that of the five nuclear powers China is the only one to have increased<br />
its arsenal by 25% since 2005) if the US and Russia were to reduce<br />
theirs to under 1,000 warheads each. Such a decision would also require<br />
Washington to reconsider the composition and size of its nuclear force,<br />
especially the withdrawal of some of its modern submarines, and also to<br />
limit the number of warheads in its missile force. In official statements<br />
and in the addresses delivered to the Conference on Disarmament or the<br />
First Committee of the United Nations on Disarmament and International<br />
Security, Chinese representatives generally hold that the purpose of disarmament<br />
and armaments control is «to increase the security of all states»<br />
and that it therefore «should not be used by stronger nations (in allusion<br />
to the US) to control weaker nations». In addition «countries should refrain<br />
from trying to achieve absolute security. Only by reducing threats from<br />
militarily stronger countries will weaker countries feel security enough to<br />
refrain from improving their nuclear arsenals».<br />
Fifth, the implementation of mechanisms to ensure full verification and,<br />
more importantly, the irreversibility of the processes of nuclear disarmament<br />
(but also chemical and, to a lesser extent, biological, until the necessary<br />
conditions for verification are met) as this is not guaranteed under the<br />
current Moscow or SORT Treaty.<br />
Sixth, progress in defining and adopting an international agreement<br />
on security assurances (positive and negative) from nuclear states to the<br />
non-nuclear states, and redefinition of the doctrine on the utilisation and<br />
role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies. This is an aspect<br />
of particular interest because the three main nuclear powers are currently<br />
reviewing their nuclear stance.<br />
The <strong>2009</strong> work programme of the Conference on Disarmament also<br />
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