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Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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Vicente Garrido Rebolledo<br />

In fourth place, as a logical consequence of the foregoing, the negotiation<br />

of new nuclear disarmament accords between the US and Russia<br />

(such as the aforementioned renewal of the START Treaty), but without dismissing<br />

the possibility of involving the three other de iure nuclear powers<br />

in the process, especially China. Beijing has stated on several occasions<br />

that it would be willing to cut back its nuclear arsenal (it should be borne in<br />

mind that of the five nuclear powers China is the only one to have increased<br />

its arsenal by 25% since 2005) if the US and Russia were to reduce<br />

theirs to under 1,000 warheads each. Such a decision would also require<br />

Washington to reconsider the composition and size of its nuclear force,<br />

especially the withdrawal of some of its modern submarines, and also to<br />

limit the number of warheads in its missile force. In official statements<br />

and in the addresses delivered to the Conference on Disarmament or the<br />

First Committee of the United Nations on Disarmament and International<br />

Security, Chinese representatives generally hold that the purpose of disarmament<br />

and armaments control is «to increase the security of all states»<br />

and that it therefore «should not be used by stronger nations (in allusion<br />

to the US) to control weaker nations». In addition «countries should refrain<br />

from trying to achieve absolute security. Only by reducing threats from<br />

militarily stronger countries will weaker countries feel security enough to<br />

refrain from improving their nuclear arsenals».<br />

Fifth, the implementation of mechanisms to ensure full verification and,<br />

more importantly, the irreversibility of the processes of nuclear disarmament<br />

(but also chemical and, to a lesser extent, biological, until the necessary<br />

conditions for verification are met) as this is not guaranteed under the<br />

current Moscow or SORT Treaty.<br />

Sixth, progress in defining and adopting an international agreement<br />

on security assurances (positive and negative) from nuclear states to the<br />

non-nuclear states, and redefinition of the doctrine on the utilisation and<br />

role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies. This is an aspect<br />

of particular interest because the three main nuclear powers are currently<br />

reviewing their nuclear stance.<br />

The <strong>2009</strong> work programme of the Conference on Disarmament also<br />

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