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Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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The AF PAK scenario<br />

For various reasons, and in different ways, these three great countries<br />

must be involved in any strategy in the region.<br />

The rivalry and wars between the two nuclear powers India and<br />

Pakistan, which are focused on the Kashmir conflict, are the origin of<br />

Pakistan’s national security doctrine which concentrates military force on<br />

the east border, thereby reducing its capacity to act against the Taliban<br />

enemy to the west. Pakistan’s inferiority—from a conventional viewpoint—<br />

vis-à-vis the Indian giant explains its use of irregular instruments of attrition<br />

such as the Jihadist groups that operate in Kashmir or in other parts<br />

of the area and the connivance of the Pakistan intelligence apparatus with<br />

the terrorist conglomerate. Their destabilising ability is huge and potentially<br />

devastating, as was proven when the countries were on the verge of<br />

war in 2002 following the attacks in Kashmir and Delhi.<br />

The Pakistani doctrine of «strategic depth», which spurred support first<br />

for Hekmatyar and later for the Taliban, springs from this rivalry with India<br />

and from this conventional inferiority. Even if only to put an end to terrorist<br />

activities it would be worth continuing the «all-embracing dialogue» between<br />

Indians and Pakistanis. Although this process has been maintained<br />

and the bilateral climate has improved, even despite the November 2008<br />

attacks in Mumbai, no progress has been made in any of the pending<br />

issues of substance (Kashmir, Siachen Glaciar, Sir Creek, etc.) which are<br />

still poisoning relations between the two countries that resulted from the<br />

division of what was once British India.<br />

The Indians refused to allow this issue to be included—even indirectly—in<br />

the portfolio of the US envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,<br />

Richard Holbrooke, or the matter to even be mentioned in the regional<br />

dossier. However it escapes nobody’s notice that any progress in the «allembracing<br />

dialogue» would help improve things in the region and, accordingly,<br />

the Afghan question and the very situation of Pakistan.<br />

Western failure in Afghanistan leading to the destabilisation of Pakistan<br />

would ultimately be the worst news for India, which would immediately suffer<br />

the consequences vis-à-vis its Jihadist and terrorist enemy at home and<br />

abroad. While India asserts itself in the world as a regional power with global<br />

aspirations and works at building up its extraordinary military might, it should<br />

not be forgotten that unless sound mechanisms are established for settling<br />

its conflicts with Pakistan and progress is made in them, creating a climate of<br />

greater confidence and shared interests in the security field, there will always<br />

be a risk of bilateral crisis and backtracking towards confrontation.<br />

— 142 —

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