Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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The AF PAK scenario<br />
For various reasons, and in different ways, these three great countries<br />
must be involved in any strategy in the region.<br />
The rivalry and wars between the two nuclear powers India and<br />
Pakistan, which are focused on the Kashmir conflict, are the origin of<br />
Pakistan’s national security doctrine which concentrates military force on<br />
the east border, thereby reducing its capacity to act against the Taliban<br />
enemy to the west. Pakistan’s inferiority—from a conventional viewpoint—<br />
vis-à-vis the Indian giant explains its use of irregular instruments of attrition<br />
such as the Jihadist groups that operate in Kashmir or in other parts<br />
of the area and the connivance of the Pakistan intelligence apparatus with<br />
the terrorist conglomerate. Their destabilising ability is huge and potentially<br />
devastating, as was proven when the countries were on the verge of<br />
war in 2002 following the attacks in Kashmir and Delhi.<br />
The Pakistani doctrine of «strategic depth», which spurred support first<br />
for Hekmatyar and later for the Taliban, springs from this rivalry with India<br />
and from this conventional inferiority. Even if only to put an end to terrorist<br />
activities it would be worth continuing the «all-embracing dialogue» between<br />
Indians and Pakistanis. Although this process has been maintained<br />
and the bilateral climate has improved, even despite the November 2008<br />
attacks in Mumbai, no progress has been made in any of the pending<br />
issues of substance (Kashmir, Siachen Glaciar, Sir Creek, etc.) which are<br />
still poisoning relations between the two countries that resulted from the<br />
division of what was once British India.<br />
The Indians refused to allow this issue to be included—even indirectly—in<br />
the portfolio of the US envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,<br />
Richard Holbrooke, or the matter to even be mentioned in the regional<br />
dossier. However it escapes nobody’s notice that any progress in the «allembracing<br />
dialogue» would help improve things in the region and, accordingly,<br />
the Afghan question and the very situation of Pakistan.<br />
Western failure in Afghanistan leading to the destabilisation of Pakistan<br />
would ultimately be the worst news for India, which would immediately suffer<br />
the consequences vis-à-vis its Jihadist and terrorist enemy at home and<br />
abroad. While India asserts itself in the world as a regional power with global<br />
aspirations and works at building up its extraordinary military might, it should<br />
not be forgotten that unless sound mechanisms are established for settling<br />
its conflicts with Pakistan and progress is made in them, creating a climate of<br />
greater confidence and shared interests in the security field, there will always<br />
be a risk of bilateral crisis and backtracking towards confrontation.<br />
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