Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

José María Robles Fraga
The Afghans realise that whatever the case it is of course the ISAF and
Enduring Freedom contingents which are guaranteeing the permanence of
the Kabul government and protecting them from the return of the Taliban
and should continue to do so until the Afghan forces are able to perform
this task in the future.
This permanence in format—and even more so the perception of this
permanence—is the only thing which can currently stop the armed rebel
groups from toppling the Kabul government and is what is keeping the
Afghans, who do not view the Taliban as winners in this fight, on our side.
It might take only a little to turn this opinion around, but it is precisely this
little, this «tipping point», which still gives us the chance to put Afghanistan
back on track.
Having accepted that this is a necessary war, we need to ensure that
it is also a possible war which can put a brake on the rapid spiralling out
of control we are witnessing, the «descent into chaos» as writer Ahmed
Rashid put it. Although the scenario is now much worse, the keys are
the same as in 2002 and 2003: international military force, governance
and development in the framework of a regional policy which takes into
account the neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, and the other
regional actors.
A NEW COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY
Some 30,000 more US troops will progressively be sent in addition to
the nearly 70,000 who are currently deployed. Indeed, in March President
Obama announced the sending of about 30,000 more soldiers. The figure
was already double the total as of the end of the Bush presidency, and
could even be tripled with the new troops sent over the course of 2010.
The aim is not only to reinforce ISAF and Enduring Freedom personnel
with new combat and support troops but also to implement a new strategy
against the insurgency over the coming 12 months. This strategy consists
primarily in stemming their advance and geographic expansion, allowing
improved security and stability conditions to be established, maintaining
the support of the Afghan population and making possible the growth and
deployment of the Afghan army in sufficient numbers.
To protect the population from armed attacks and terrorism it would
furthermore be necessary to change the Afghan army’s rules of combat
and even the methods of training. We are now working on the assumption
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