Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the <strong>2010</strong> NPT review conference<br />
during the denuclearisation negotiations with North Korea which forced<br />
Pyongyang to make a full declaration on its military nuclear programme. In<br />
his biography, entitled «In the line of fire», Pervez Musharraf disclosed that<br />
Dr Khan sold nearly «two dozen» P-1 and P-11 prototype centrifuges for<br />
uranium enrichment to North Korea, and that «to the Iranians and Libyans,<br />
through Dubai, he provided nearly eighteen tons of materials, including<br />
centrifuges, components and drawings».<br />
Finally, Israel is the only non-declared nuclear state, as its nuclear policy is<br />
based on refusing to officially confirm or deny if it possesses a nuclear arsenal,<br />
has developed nuclear weapons or has a programme of nuclear weapons.<br />
Although it has never conducted a nuclear test, the consideration of Israel as<br />
a de facto nuclear power is based on the statements made in 1986 by one<br />
of the architects of the programme, Mordechai Vanunu and, specifically, on<br />
the Dimona installations in the Negev desert(29). Israel, which has not signed<br />
the NPT either (although it is a party to the CTBT) requires as a condition for<br />
doing so the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the<br />
region, which would involve putting an end to the programmes for the development<br />
of chemical and biological weapons of many of what Israel regards<br />
as its hostile neighbours. In May 2008 the former US president James Carter<br />
declared that Israel possessed 150 or more nuclear weapons.<br />
Many non-nuclear states (especially those belonging to the Non-Aligned<br />
Group) regard the NPT not as an end in itself but as a means of transition<br />
along the path leading to total nuclear disarmament, in accordance with<br />
article VI of the Treaty itself. This article contains a general, abstract clause<br />
whereby the nuclear states undertake (as a minimum commitment to<br />
keep the non-nuclear states happy) to «pursue negotiations in good faith<br />
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an<br />
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and<br />
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control».<br />
However, in the view of the nuclear states (especially the United States)<br />
which gave an a posteriori interpretation of this article, the obligation to<br />
desist from the arms race neither refers solely to the nuclear countries nor<br />
explicitly requires the conclusion of agreements on disarmament, since<br />
the Treaty neither indicates the manner of conducting such negotiations<br />
(save «in good faith») nor even establishes a specific date (beyond «early»).<br />
(29) The (almost only) reference book on the Israel nuclear programme, although not without<br />
controversy, is HERSH, Seymour, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and<br />
American Foreign Policy, Ramdon House, 1991.<br />
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