Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

José María Robles Fraga
population—or at least the most populated cities and regions. It is also
necessary to find a better institutional and above all political balance so
that these inhabitants recover their lost confidence in ISAF and in their
own government or feel that they are represented by, and are part of, this
form of government, especially the Pashtu minority who are the Taliban
power base. More than the policy of Kabul, what seems even more important
is to act sub-nationally and locally, as it is on these levels which most
Afghans live and operate and the civilian and military action of the coalition
has more of an impact.
It is this policy of gaining allies from among the population and eroding
the support of the insurgency in order to divide and ultimately defeat it
which will require a political presence on the ground, more funds to back
counterinsurgency operations and above all better intelligence and information
than has so far been available to ISAF vis-à-vis the greater capabilities
of the insurgents in this field.
A consideration that is shared by European and Americans is the need
to accompany the new counterinsurgency effort and tactics with a greater
civilian deployment and greater development funds, particularly in agriculture,
which is the means of living of 80% of the Afghan population and
generates 55% of the country’s GDP. Agriculture is in a state of decline
and neglect in Afghanistan owing to the havoc wrought by the successive
wars and lack of investment in irrigation infrastructure, seeds and proper
training, whereas the cultivation of opium poppies, which finances a considerable
part of crime and the insurgency, is thriving. The need has been
considered for a sort of integrated, comprehensive «green Marshall Plan»
which, in addition to improving the population’s living conditions, would
guarantee food security and enable the Afghans to switch from subsistence
farming to commercial agriculture and, ultimately, export agriculture.
As the withdrawal of our troops will need to be considered at some
point, the strategy must include a very significant reform of the Afghan
security forces. This will involve not only increasing them in number but
also enhancing their capabilities and the loyalty of their personnel, as well
as commitment to creating a new relationship of greater trust between
ISAF troops and their Afghan colleagues as a further means of exploiting
the relative prestige the Afghan army enjoys among the population, unlike
the discredited police. As is nearly always the case, the diagnosis and
even the recommended remedies may be correct but there is a shortage
of time to put some of them into practice. Indeed, the date set, 2011, for
beginning to change the reality in the field of operations could be too soon
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