Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the <strong>2010</strong> NPT review conference<br />
Conversely, countries like India (which conducted its first nuclear test<br />
in 1974), Pakistan (which retaliated to the nuclear tests carried out by its<br />
neighbour India in May 1998 with a series of six explosions) (24) and Israel<br />
(which, despite its nuclear capability, has never conducted a nuclear test)<br />
are considered de facto but not de iure nuclear powers, and for this reason<br />
refuse to sign the NPT, being the only three states not to have done so.<br />
India accuses the «deficiencies» of the NPT of making the world «a more<br />
dangerous place and called for the replacement of the NPT with a Nuclear<br />
Weapons Convention that would agree steps towards the elimination of<br />
nuclear weapons» (25).<br />
In March 2006 the US and India signed a controversial agreement<br />
on nuclear cooperation in civilian matters which includes, among other<br />
things, the supply of nuclear fuel and technology. Negotiation of the<br />
civilian nuclear cooperation deal was conducted through two legislative<br />
instruments. The first of these instruments, the Henry J. Hyde United<br />
States and India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (the<br />
«Hyde Act»), marks a substantial change in US non-proliferation policy<br />
of the past three decades (amendment to the Nuclear Non Proliferation<br />
Act of 1978). It furthermore allows cooperation with a nuclear country<br />
that does not accept the total IAEA safeguards and to which highly<br />
sensitive nuclear technology so far subject to strict international checks<br />
will be exported, such as those established by the Nuclear Suppliers<br />
Group (NSG) which was precisely set up after India’s nuclear explosion<br />
of 1974. The second of the legislative instruments is a bilateral cooperation<br />
agreement concluded pursuant to Section 123 of the 1954 Atomic<br />
Energy Act («the 123 Agreement»). It took 4 rounds of negotiations to<br />
reach a final agreement on 27 July 2007, which was viewed as a major<br />
triumph by the New Delhi authorities. India accepts nuclear safeguards<br />
only for civilian installations and activities, not for military activities, but<br />
the US considers it «a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology»,<br />
amending the guidelines of the US Non-Proliferation Act. The<br />
signing of the agreement on 8 October 2008 involved amending certain<br />
(24) On the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V.,<br />
«India, Pakistán y el Régimen de No proliferación Nuclear», Política Exterior, No. 64,<br />
July-August 1998, pp. 99-107; «India y Pakistán: ¿dos nuevas potencias nucleares?»,<br />
Revista Española de Defensa, July-August 1998, pp. 72-77; «¿Locura nuclear asiática?»,<br />
Tiempo de Paz, No. 49, MPDL, Autumn 1998, pp. 53-63; «India y Pakistán: El nacimiento<br />
de dos Estados nucleares» in Anuario del CIP, 1999, Icaria, Barcelona, 1999, pp. 107-<br />
114.<br />
(25) «Indian Prime Minister attacks nuclear treaty», Financial Times, 29 September <strong>2009</strong>,<br />
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cb5b3a26-acf5-11de-91dc-00144feabdc0.html.<br />
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