Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

José María Robles Fraga
ring the implementation of a consistent and continued policy to combat
terrorism and its tribal allies at the border. It is undeniable that the Afghan
insurgency is backed from Pakistan both by the presence of its leaders in
Quetta and in the tribal areas of the FATAs («Federally Administered Tribal
Territories») as well as by the ties and alliances with al-Qaeda and affiliated
movements.
Musharraf’s fall after a long drawn out political crisis and the arrival in
power of a civilian government came during 2008 amid a major terrorist
offensive from al-Qaeda and the Taliban which repeatedly struck the heart
of Pakistan’s most important cities and assassinated one of the country’s
most important leaders, former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, and
approached the capital from Swat Valley. It now seems easy to say that
Pakistan’s double dealing led inexorably to the strengthening of Taliban
power and its spread to new parts of Pakistan’s territory. But nobody
could have predicted the change and huge adaptive capacity of Pakistani
Jihadism, which has succeeded in establishing itself as an autonomous
player no longer dependent on its former employers of the secret services
of the ISI and adopting an agenda of its own which threatens the security
and very existence of the Islamic Republic.
The dual language of Pakistan’s diplomacy stems from a basic misunderstanding:
whereas to us westerners the common enemy is the Taliban
and al-Qaeda, to Pakistan the chief obsessive threat is India, against
which the action of the Jihadist terrorist groups in Kashmir became an
effective instrument of attrition.
In Islamabad Afghanistan continues to be viewed as a secondary stage
where the deadly rivalry with India is fought out and not as a country
whose stability and security are values unto themselves that are important
to Pakistan itself. To Pakistan’s political class, an Afghan state is
only meaningful if it is under the influence of Pakistan, as otherwise, if it
fell under the influence of India, the worst of strategic nightmares would
occur—that is, Pakistan would be encircled by its worst enemy. There are
few things that concern Islamabad more today than the growing influence
of India in Afghanistan and the activities of the Indian consulates near the
borders with Pakistan. Therefore, in order to secure the fullest collaboration
of Islamabad, to create a climate of confidence in security matters—
both in the fight against terrorism and in dismantling the Taliban rearguard
at the border and in the tribal territories—and to change this perception
of the Afghan problem in terms of enmity with India, it is necessary to
address the question of relations with India and the perception of this
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