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Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the <strong>2010</strong> NPT review conference<br />

At any rate, everything appears to indicate that President Obama’s initiative<br />

has come at a good time. It should be borne in mind that Russia’s<br />

current economic situation does not allow it to increase its strategic<br />

nuclear potential in the short term, particularly considering that over the<br />

next ten years it needs to replace at least 300 intercontinental groundbased<br />

ballistic missiles and a further 100 missiles on board Soviet-made<br />

nuclear submarines. From this viewpoint it would even be feasible to think<br />

of strategic nuclear reductions in the region of 1,000 warheads.<br />

Another of the important novelties is that Russia has shown itself to be<br />

in favour of dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons only after the talks on<br />

the reduction of strategic offensive weapons are concluded. The Russian<br />

foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated at the end of October <strong>2009</strong> that he<br />

was sure that the new treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons will<br />

establish a link between offensive and defensive weapons.<br />

Naturally, the future architecture of the US missile defence system<br />

will also determine strategic nuclear relations with Russia, especially after<br />

President Obama announced he was scrapping the project to install part of<br />

the components of the missile shield in Eastern Europe. The US president<br />

justified the controversial decision by the need to adapt military assets<br />

to the development of the Iranian nuclear programme in recent years.<br />

According to the White House, this had made it necessary to replace the<br />

initial defence programme—much more costly, technologically advanced<br />

(and, above all, more politically explosive)—with the simple deployment<br />

of SM-3 interceptors. These systems will first be installed in ships and<br />

will subsequently (not before 2015) begin to be deployed on the ground,<br />

chiefly in some southern European countries and Turkey. «Our new missile<br />

defence architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter and swifter<br />

defences of American forces and America’s allies. It is more comprehensive<br />

than the previous programme; it deploys capabilities that are proven<br />

and cost-effective», stated Barack Obama when announcing his decision<br />

(54). For his part, the Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev, applauded<br />

the US decision, which he described as responsible and positive and as<br />

giving «impetus to the joint work to address the risks of the proliferation<br />

of nuclear weapons»(55).<br />

(54) «Obama renuncia al escudo antimisiles», El País, 18 September <strong>2009</strong>, http://<br />

www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Obama/renuncia/escudo/antimisiles/<br />

epepiint/<strong>2009</strong>0918elpepiint_2/Tes.<br />

(55) «Una victoria diplomática para Rusia», El País, 18 September <strong>2009</strong>, http://www.elpais.<br />

com/articulo/internacional/victoria/diplomatica/Rusia/elpepiint/<strong>2009</strong>0918elpepiint_3/<br />

Tes.<br />

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