Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the <strong>2010</strong> NPT review conference<br />
At any rate, everything appears to indicate that President Obama’s initiative<br />
has come at a good time. It should be borne in mind that Russia’s<br />
current economic situation does not allow it to increase its strategic<br />
nuclear potential in the short term, particularly considering that over the<br />
next ten years it needs to replace at least 300 intercontinental groundbased<br />
ballistic missiles and a further 100 missiles on board Soviet-made<br />
nuclear submarines. From this viewpoint it would even be feasible to think<br />
of strategic nuclear reductions in the region of 1,000 warheads.<br />
Another of the important novelties is that Russia has shown itself to be<br />
in favour of dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons only after the talks on<br />
the reduction of strategic offensive weapons are concluded. The Russian<br />
foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated at the end of October <strong>2009</strong> that he<br />
was sure that the new treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons will<br />
establish a link between offensive and defensive weapons.<br />
Naturally, the future architecture of the US missile defence system<br />
will also determine strategic nuclear relations with Russia, especially after<br />
President Obama announced he was scrapping the project to install part of<br />
the components of the missile shield in Eastern Europe. The US president<br />
justified the controversial decision by the need to adapt military assets<br />
to the development of the Iranian nuclear programme in recent years.<br />
According to the White House, this had made it necessary to replace the<br />
initial defence programme—much more costly, technologically advanced<br />
(and, above all, more politically explosive)—with the simple deployment<br />
of SM-3 interceptors. These systems will first be installed in ships and<br />
will subsequently (not before 2015) begin to be deployed on the ground,<br />
chiefly in some southern European countries and Turkey. «Our new missile<br />
defence architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter and swifter<br />
defences of American forces and America’s allies. It is more comprehensive<br />
than the previous programme; it deploys capabilities that are proven<br />
and cost-effective», stated Barack Obama when announcing his decision<br />
(54). For his part, the Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev, applauded<br />
the US decision, which he described as responsible and positive and as<br />
giving «impetus to the joint work to address the risks of the proliferation<br />
of nuclear weapons»(55).<br />
(54) «Obama renuncia al escudo antimisiles», El País, 18 September <strong>2009</strong>, http://<br />
www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Obama/renuncia/escudo/antimisiles/<br />
epepiint/<strong>2009</strong>0918elpepiint_2/Tes.<br />
(55) «Una victoria diplomática para Rusia», El País, 18 September <strong>2009</strong>, http://www.elpais.<br />
com/articulo/internacional/victoria/diplomatica/Rusia/elpepiint/<strong>2009</strong>0918elpepiint_3/<br />
Tes.<br />
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