Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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Vicente Garrido Rebolledo<br />
Nevertheless, the starting point of the <strong>2010</strong> Conference is that any progress<br />
in non-proliferation must go hand in hand with significant progress<br />
in the field of disarmament in order for the NPT to retain its credibility in<br />
the future. In this connection Barack Obama’s advent to the White House<br />
has marked an important turning point with respect to George W. Bush,<br />
especially if we consider that the new Administration has launched numerous<br />
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation proposals which have led<br />
to the unblocking of some international initiatives and agreements. Some<br />
examples of the foregoing are the signing of a new START Treaty with the<br />
Russian Federation (scheduled for the end of <strong>2009</strong>) on the reduction of<br />
strategic nuclear arsenals, the negotiation of which has in turn been made<br />
possible by a substantial change in the architecture of the US missile<br />
shield (which initially involved stationing a ground radar on Czech territory<br />
and ten laser missile interceptors in Poland); the ratification of the CTBT;<br />
and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT or Fissban).<br />
THE WHY AND WHEREFORE OF A NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION<br />
TREATY<br />
Although the idea of nuclear non-proliferation began to be considered<br />
in 1961, the term itself was not coined until four years later following the<br />
start of negotiations on the NPT. It was initially based on the statistical<br />
danger nuclear proliferation posed: on the one hand, the possibility that<br />
a nuclear war could also increase the number of states in possession of<br />
nuclear weapons; and on the other, concern about the devastating effects<br />
of an accidental launch of these weapons by the US or USSR (11).<br />
Following the explosion of China’s first uranium 235-based nuclear<br />
bomb on 16 October 1964 (contrary to all calculations) (12), the other four<br />
nuclear states (the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and<br />
France, in order of access to nuclear weapons) began to be aware of the<br />
problem posed by an increasing number of countries possessing nuclear<br />
weapons and of the need to set a limit, by means of political and diplo-<br />
(11) For a detailed analysis of the negotiations and contents of the NPT see GARRIDO<br />
REBOLLEDO, Vicente, El régimen de no proliferación nuclear: participación e implicaciones<br />
para España, doctoral thesis, Servicio de publicaciones de la UCM, Madrid, 1995<br />
(1032 pp.).<br />
(12) One of the most complete studies on the history of nuclear energy and the political<br />
motivations of states in relation to their access to nuclear weapons is GOLDSCHMIDT,<br />
Bertrand, The Atomic Complex. A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy,<br />
American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 1982.<br />
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