Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE
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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the <strong>2010</strong> NPT review conference<br />
has assumed that life-saving property for Pakistan» (72).<br />
This assertion helps structure Pakistan’s (unofficial) nuclear doctrine<br />
around two premises: first, that nuclear weapons are necessary to neutralise<br />
India’s conventional superiority vis-à-vis a possible attack on its<br />
territory; and second, that nuclear weapons make it a match for India in<br />
terms of power (in strategic but also political terms). However, there is a<br />
substantial difference in the doctrine or strategic thought of both countries:<br />
Pakistan, unlike India, considers militarily utilisable nuclear weapons<br />
(even in the event of a conventional war) to be not only a defensive instrument<br />
but also an offensive instrument and even envisages their use<br />
in a low-intensity conflict or in defence against «punitive action» by third<br />
parties (73).<br />
As for Israel, any agreement involves establishing a Middle East<br />
Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (applying not only to nuclear<br />
weapons, in view of the chemical and/or biological capabilities of some<br />
countries in the region). It should be remembered that only three Middle<br />
East states (Jordan, Kuwait and Libya, in addition to Turkey if we include<br />
it in the area) have total safeguard agreements in force with the IAEA.<br />
What is more, developments in the nuclear crisis with Iran (and, to a lesser<br />
extent, talks with North Korea aimed at its denuclearisation and return<br />
to the NPT, a situation that is not envisaged in the short term) will also<br />
influence debates in the field of the NPT Conference as what is at stake<br />
is, after all, the ability of the non-proliferation regime and of the Treaty in<br />
particular to stem Tehran’s military nuclear aspirations.<br />
In November 2005 Mohammed El-Baradei, former director of the IAEA,<br />
announced a document containing a package of measures to advance in<br />
non-proliferation and nuclear weapons control which is still valid: establishment<br />
of a moratorium of five to ten years on the construction of new uranium<br />
enrichment and plutonium separation facilities; conversion of highly<br />
enriched uranium-fuelled research reactors into non-military uranium and<br />
making the former unnecessary for peaceful nuclear uses; adoption of the<br />
IAEA Additional Protocol as a compulsory verification regulation of the<br />
NPT; involvement of the United Nations Security Council in cases where a<br />
country decides to withdraw from the NPT; commitment on the part of all<br />
(72) General ISLAM BEG, Mirza, «Pakistan’s Nuclear Imperatives», National Development<br />
and Security, No. 19, February 1997, pp. 23-75.<br />
(73) SETHI, Manpreet, «Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy», Institute of Peace and<br />
Conflict Studies (IPCS), article no. 2361, 23 August 2007, http://www.ipcs.org/newKashmirLevel2.jsp?<br />
action=showView&kValue=2377&subCatID=null&mod=null<br />
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