13.11.2014 Views

Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the <strong>2010</strong> NPT review conference<br />

has assumed that life-saving property for Pakistan» (72).<br />

This assertion helps structure Pakistan’s (unofficial) nuclear doctrine<br />

around two premises: first, that nuclear weapons are necessary to neutralise<br />

India’s conventional superiority vis-à-vis a possible attack on its<br />

territory; and second, that nuclear weapons make it a match for India in<br />

terms of power (in strategic but also political terms). However, there is a<br />

substantial difference in the doctrine or strategic thought of both countries:<br />

Pakistan, unlike India, considers militarily utilisable nuclear weapons<br />

(even in the event of a conventional war) to be not only a defensive instrument<br />

but also an offensive instrument and even envisages their use<br />

in a low-intensity conflict or in defence against «punitive action» by third<br />

parties (73).<br />

As for Israel, any agreement involves establishing a Middle East<br />

Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (applying not only to nuclear<br />

weapons, in view of the chemical and/or biological capabilities of some<br />

countries in the region). It should be remembered that only three Middle<br />

East states (Jordan, Kuwait and Libya, in addition to Turkey if we include<br />

it in the area) have total safeguard agreements in force with the IAEA.<br />

What is more, developments in the nuclear crisis with Iran (and, to a lesser<br />

extent, talks with North Korea aimed at its denuclearisation and return<br />

to the NPT, a situation that is not envisaged in the short term) will also<br />

influence debates in the field of the NPT Conference as what is at stake<br />

is, after all, the ability of the non-proliferation regime and of the Treaty in<br />

particular to stem Tehran’s military nuclear aspirations.<br />

In November 2005 Mohammed El-Baradei, former director of the IAEA,<br />

announced a document containing a package of measures to advance in<br />

non-proliferation and nuclear weapons control which is still valid: establishment<br />

of a moratorium of five to ten years on the construction of new uranium<br />

enrichment and plutonium separation facilities; conversion of highly<br />

enriched uranium-fuelled research reactors into non-military uranium and<br />

making the former unnecessary for peaceful nuclear uses; adoption of the<br />

IAEA Additional Protocol as a compulsory verification regulation of the<br />

NPT; involvement of the United Nations Security Council in cases where a<br />

country decides to withdraw from the NPT; commitment on the part of all<br />

(72) General ISLAM BEG, Mirza, «Pakistan’s Nuclear Imperatives», National Development<br />

and Security, No. 19, February 1997, pp. 23-75.<br />

(73) SETHI, Manpreet, «Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy», Institute of Peace and<br />

Conflict Studies (IPCS), article no. 2361, 23 August 2007, http://www.ipcs.org/newKashmirLevel2.jsp?<br />

action=showView&kValue=2377&subCatID=null&mod=null<br />

— 222 —

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!