Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the 2010 NPT review conference However, the Obama Administration’s new approach to the North Korean nuclear issue differs substantially from that of the Bush Administration. For example, despite North Korea’s announcement in November 2009 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods and had accomplished «Noticeable successes […] in turning the extracted plutonium weapon-grade for the purpose of bolstering up the nuclear deterrent» (in violation of its own denuclearisation commitments and several UN Security Council resolutions), the US has not adopted any sanctions, stating that «Washington is only focused on achieving «a comprehensive peaceful solution to the As for Iran, the Obama Administration’s official line is also diametrically opposite to that of its predecessor. Barack Obama stated at Prague that «Iran has yet to build a nuclear weapon. My administration will seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We believe in dialogue. But in that dialogue we will present a clear choice. We want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations, politically and economically. We will support Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy with rigorous inspections. That’s a path that the Islamic Republic can take. Or the government can choose increased isolation, international pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in the region that will increase insecurity for all.» Nevertheless, the course of events has led this discourse, which was initially optimistic about the Iranian nuclear crisis (in his address to Cairo University on 4 June 2009, President Obama reiterated his willingness to the Iranian leaders and people to «move forward without preconditions on the basis of mutual respect») to become more realistic. Indeed, pressure on Iran and a more favourable attitude on the part of the US towards the implementation of stricter sanctions has become more evident following the discovery in September 2009 of a second underground pilot uranium enrichment plant not previously declared to the IAEA in Qom, which, according to the organisation, «does not contribute to the building of confidence» (61). On 15 December 2009, the US House of Representatives approved by overwhelming majority new sanctions against Iran and companies that do business with its government as a punishment for failing to suspend (61) Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General of the IAEA, GOV/2009/74, 16 November 2009. — 214 —
Vicente Garrido Rebolledo its nuclear programme. The measure stipulates that the Executive will impose sanctions on energy companies that supply refined oil to Iran, help it import these resources or help it maintain or expand its petroleum refining capabilities. The United States will ban access to its market to the foreign companies that violate this legislation to; nor will they be able to receive financial assistance from institutions such as the US Export-Import Bank. The initiative goes beyond the Iranian energy sector but its chief goal is, for practical purposes, to eliminate petrol exports to Iran, which relies on up to 40 percent of foreign refined petroleum and diesel fuel to supply its needs. It also restricts the United States’ nuclear cooperation with countries whose governments or citizens supply Iran with equipment and materials that enhance its ability in this field. It furthermore imposes sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and any Iranian financial institution involved in terrorist activities or nuclear proliferation and on entities which conduct financial transactions with these institutions (62). The day after the sanctions were approved, the Iranian army announced the «successful» testing of an advanced version of its medium-range solid-fuel Sajil-2 missile, which is capable of reaching Israel and the US bases in the Persian Gulf (63). As Miguel Aguirre de Cárcer points out, the Iranian nuclear issue is probably the most significant challenge currently faced by the US, especially the question of how to address it in a few months’ time if the offers of direct diplomatic talks prove unsuccessful and sanctions are reinforced. This is due, above all, to the negative impact this could have for security in the Middle East and the regional peace process, but it could also affect the «resetting» of bilateral relations between the US and the Russian Federation which President Obama is attempting to promote(64). Finally, it should be stressed that fighting nuclear terrorism is high on the list of the Obama Administration’s priorities. In his address given at Prague, Barack Obama stated that «we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would (62) «La Cámara de Representantes aprueba más sanciones contra Irán», El Mundo, 15 December 2009, http://www.elmundo.es/america/2009/12/16/estados_unidos/1260924441.html (63) «Teherán prueba «con éxito» una versión avanzada de un misil capaz de alcanzar Israel», Agencia EFE, 16 December 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/epa/ article/ALeqM5gWNFkDJgpfP1LmEieREFkzIAKmbg. (64) AGUIRRE DE CÁRCER, M., Las propuestas…., op. cit., p. 12. — 215 —
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MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA SPANISH INSTI
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DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INSTITUTION
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INTRODUCTION
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Introduction To this end he propose
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Introduction II The economic crisis
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THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND ITS IMPACT
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Federico Steinberg Whesler CHART 3
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CHAPTER TWO CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS
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Climate change and its security imp
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CHAPTER THREE INTERNATIONAL RELATIO
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International relations and the new
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THE AF PAK SCENARIO Jo s é Ma r í
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José María Robles Fraga dangerous
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THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE COMMON
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Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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