Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the <strong>2010</strong> NPT review conference its indefinite extension for one or several supplementary periods or, conversely, its termination, was to be decided on in 1995 by a Conference of States Parties to the Treaty. However, the main idea was that the indefinite extension of the NPT should not be viewed as the ultimate and exclusive aim of the 1995 Conference, but that the Conference should be used to secure greater concessions from the nuclear powers and to progress in negotiations on nuclear disarmament (31). In disarmament matters the 1995 Review Conference decided that the indefinite extension of the NPT required, in exchange, much more specific commitments from the nuclear states in the light of article VI of the Treaty. As the Russian foreign minister stated during the conference, «indefinite extension should not mean indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers». Some non-nuclear states (especially those belonging to the Non- Aligned Movement) saw the conferences as a chance to establish a closer link between disarmament and non-proliferation commitments so as to be able to define the obligations to which the nuclear states were subject under article VI of the Treaty. To this end (in addition to two decisions on reinforcement of the NTP review process and indefinite extension of the Treaty and a resolution on the Middle East) one of the most significant (and unexpected) documents on nuclear disarmament was adopted. Entitled Principles and Objectives of Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation (32) (commonly known as «P&Os»), although not considered legally binding by the nuclear powers (it is not a resolution but a decision adopted in the context of the indefinite extension of the NPT), it topped the negotiation agenda during the following decades (33). The agenda was structured around several major short- and medium-term priorities, the first three of which are still perceived today as essential aspects of the non-proliferation regime. The first priority was to achieve the universalisation of the NPT as a matter of urgency: that is, to ensure that states which were not yet Parties to the Treaty signed it as soon as possible (especially those with (31) For an analysis of the genesis and results of the 1995 NTP Review and Extension Conference see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «La Conferencia de Revisión y Prórroga del TNP: el debate entre consenso o mayoría», Meridiano CERI, No. 3, Madrid, 1995, pp. 13-16; «Después de Nueva York: la fragilidad de la no proliferación nuclear» Papeles de Cuestiones Internacionales, No. 55, CIP, Madrid, 1995, pp. 81-87. (32) Conference Paper NPT/CONF.1995/L.5 of 9 May 1995. Available for consultation at http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/pdf/bb2008/partii/sectione.pdf. (33) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., La Conferencia de Revisión y Prórroga del TNP…, op. cit. — 198 —
Vicente Garrido Rebolledo nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA safeguards, namely Israel, India and Pakistan—which remain reluctant to do so to this day). The second priority was the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as proliferation seriously increases the danger of a nuclear war. «Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty». The third was to achieve nuclear disarmament in a broad sense. The nuclear-weapon states reaffirmed their commitment, as stated in article VI of the NPT, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. To ensure the full and effective enforcement of this article an action plan was adopted (constituting the essence of the decision on the P&Os), based in turn on five progressive measures beginning with the negotiation and entry into force of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996 (finally adopted on 10 September 1996 but not yet in force owing, among other things, to the failure of the United States, Israel, India and Pakistan to ratify it (34)). As of December <strong>2009</strong>, the CTBT had been signed by 181 states and ratified by 150 (31 of the 44 states necessary for the definitive entry into force of the Treaty have signed but not yet ratified it). The second priority was the immediate commencement of negotiations leading to the prompt adoption of a nondiscriminatory and universally applicable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT or Fissban)(35). Lastly, a commitment was sought from the five de iure nuclear-weapon states (P-5) to make systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of completely eliminating them, and to promote general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. (34) On the CTBT see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Pruebas Nucleares: Punto y final» in Anuario del CIP 1996-1997, Icaria, Barcelona, 1997, pp. 347-359. (35) «Fissionable» refers to any material with atoms capable of undergoing nuclear fission. «Fissile» applies to materials which are fissionable by neutrons with zero kinetic energy. «Fissile» is thus more restrictive than «fissionable»—although all fissile materials are fissionable, not all fissionable materials are fissile. Uranium-238 (U-238) is fissionable but not fissile. Neutrons produced by fission of U-235 have an energy of around 1 MeV (100 TJ/kg, i.e. a speed of 14.000 km/s) and cannot fission U-238, but neutrons produced by deuterium-tritium fusion have an energy of 14.1 MeV (1400 TJ/kg, i.e. a speed of 52,000 km/s) and can effectively fission uranium-238 and other non-fissile actinides. The neutrons produced by this fission are again not fast enough to produce new fissions, so U-238 does not sustain a chain reaction. — 199 —
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MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA SPANISH INSTI
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DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INSTITUTION
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INTRODUCTION
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Introduction included a chapter on
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Introduction To this end he propose
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Introduction II The economic crisis
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Introduction The authors go on to e
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Introduction The next question aske
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Introduction truly representative d
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Introduction Indeed, the insurgency
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Introduction exercises its influenc
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Introduction security of Europe»;
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Introduction them; as India stated,
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Introduction 4. Negotiation of new
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THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND ITS IMPACT
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Federico Steinberg Whesler CHART 3
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CHAPTER TWO CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS
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Climate change and its security imp
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CHAPTER THREE INTERNATIONAL RELATIO
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International relations and the new
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THE AF PAK SCENARIO Jo s é Ma r í
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José María Robles Fraga From now
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José María Robles Fraga dangerous
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