Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the 2010 NPT review conference ment agenda, and prefer direct negotiations between the P-5. These negotiations should initially take place at bilateral level between the United States and Russia and later be extended to the rest of the nuclear states within a restricted multilateral framework. The main criticism levelled by the non-nuclear countries is that the nuclear powers have not done enough to meet the objectives established in the action plan adopted in 2000. The former point out that the P-5 have systematically attempted to disassociate themselves and reinterpret the list of the «13 practical steps», claiming that what matters is not the issues relating to article VI of the NPT, but violations of the Treaty. Another example of the different perceptions of the priorities is the French-US alliance forged at the 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee in which references to the 2000 document were minimal and, what is more, not even a document with recommendations for the 2005 conference was adopted (42). The US has traditionally been at the centre of the criticisms of failure to comply with disarmament commitments, beginning with former president Bush’s refusal to ratify the CTBT, failure to support the adoption of an FMCT (regarded as not effectively verifiable) and the doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons (in favour of negative security assurances for the States Parties to the NPT, but without relinquishing the use of nuclear weapons against a state possessing chemical and/or biological weapons) (43). In turn, the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (following its unilateral denunciation) on 13 June 2002 drove a wedge into bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow in disarmament and armaments control issues. Moscow viewed the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of disarmament and retaliated to the US withdrawal by declaring itself no longer bound by the (Nuclear) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) the following day, 14 June. The ABM Treaty was based on the principle of nuclear deterrence, according to which a country would abstain from using its nuclear weapons if it knew that the target state would respond with its own nuclear weapons. Under the Treaty the number of weapons and radars permitted was limited and it was agreed to use missiles only in the national territories. Both countries agreed not to manufacture any (42) For a summary of the results of the 2004 PrepCom see «Laying Substantive Groundwork for 2010: Report of the 2009 NPT PrepCom», Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 91, summer 2009, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd91/91npt.htm. (43) SCHEINMAN, Lawrence, «Disarmament: Have the five nuclear powers done enough?», Arms Control Today, January-February 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01- 02/Scheinman. — 204 —
Vicente Garrido Rebolledo system other than that of the fixed, ground-based defences they had already developed, but the Treaty allowed them to continue with tests and to develop weapons of this type (although it also banned national missile defence systems). The Treaty began with the words «proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind». The then US president, George W. Bush, concluded that the ABM Treaty «hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks» (44), and regarded it as a «relic of the past, of the Cold War days and, consequently, obsolete» (45). However, underlying the whole debate was a weighty reason: the ABM was greatly hampering the future deployment of the US missile defence shield—that is, up to a point, because the Treaty permitted the completion of tests for the medium-range land-based system, the centrepiece of the National Missile Defence programme. Former President Clinton’s plans for the deployment of a missile defence shield only envisaged the installation of a new land-based radar in Alaska, where the missile interceptors were also to be located. This involved introducing slight changes to the ABM Treaty by amending articles 1 and 3. It should also be borne in mind that Clinton’s initial proposal was only intended to protect the US’s west coast from a potential attack with ballistic missiles launched from enemy or rogue states such as North Korea or, subsequently, Iran. By no means did the system aim to offer protection to Europe against a potential attack by one of these countries (which fell under the global, non-specific and changeable heading of «the axis of evil»). The formal request submitted by the US to Poland and the Czech Republic in January 2007 to negotiate the installation of 10 silo-based missile interceptors and a radar station respectively against mediumand long-range ballistic missiles from the Middle East triggered the new missile crisis with Russia, which viewed these plans as a direct threat against the country and its borders. The proposal was part of the Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) and would be the third ground-based site following the deployment in Alaska and California. The proposal to extend the BMDS programme to European territory raised political and technical objections. The former were based on the (44) LOBE, Jim, «Desarme-EEUU: Adiós al Tratado de Misiles Antibalísticos», Inter Press Service New Agency, Washington, 13 December 2005, http://www.ipsenespanol.net/ ataque/1312_5.shtml. (45) «Bush y Putin redefinen las reglas de la seguridad mundial», El Mundo, 16 June 2001. — 205 —
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MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA SPANISH INSTI
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DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INSTITUTION
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INTRODUCTION
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Introduction included a chapter on
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Introduction To this end he propose
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Introduction II The economic crisis
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Introduction The next question aske
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Introduction 4. Negotiation of new
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THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND ITS IMPACT
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Federico Steinberg Whesler to Europ
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Federico Steinberg Whesler CHART 3
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CHAPTER TWO CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS
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Climate change and its security imp
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CHAPTER THREE INTERNATIONAL RELATIO
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International relations and the new
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THE AF PAK SCENARIO Jo s é Ma r í
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José María Robles Fraga From now
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José María Robles Fraga dangerous
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THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE COMMON
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