Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

Vicente Garrido Rebolledo
international agreements at the IAEA and NSG, apart from requiring
ratification by the US Senate (26).
As for Pakistan, construction of the atomic bomb has always been psychologically
important to its rulers, as it makes it the only nuclear state in
the Islamic world and grants it a special status in the Islamic Community of
nations (the dream of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who referred to the Islamic bomb in
terms of civilisation). This obsession with succeeding in equalling India in the
arms race led Ali Bhutto to state that his people would «eat grass if necessary
but build the atomic bomb», underlining the huge economic effort this would
entail for the country. Like most of the states which have developed nuclear
weapons, Pakistan has not settled for producing first-generation weapons
based on uranium enrichment. Since the past decade (coinciding with the
conducting of its nuclear tests, which used a solid core of highly enriched
uranium), it has been developing plutonium production capabilities. This suggests
that Islamabad is preparing to increase and redesign its nuclear forces
in response to India’s plans to deploy a «nuclear triad» based on nuclear
missiles launched from air, surface and underwater platforms. Nevertheless,
it is difficult to calculate the type and number of nuclear weapons that make
up Pakistan’s current nuclear arsenal, as they are highly variable. Estimations
range from 40 to 70 already manufactured nuclear weapons and a capability,
based on its reserves of fissionable material, to build between 30 and 52
additional nuclear warheads. Pakistan furthermore stores its delivery vehicles
and warheads separately, except in Kahuta and Multan. In 2000 President
Musharraf established a new C2 system by creating a Nuclear Command
Authority (27). Pakistan, which like India has not signed the CTBT, has on
occasions requested the US to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement similar
to that concluded with India, but this is highly unlikely to occur.
In February 2004 the architect of the Pakistani nuclear programme,
Abdul Qadeer Khan, publicly admitted to having been involved in transferring
nuclear material and technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya between
1986 and 1993 (28). The Khan affair again came to light early in 2008
(26) On the contents of the agreement see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «La cooperación
nuclear Estados Unidos -India», Política Exterior, No. 108, November-December 2005,
pp. 28-34; «India, potencia nuclear. Implicaciones regionales» in YSART, Federico (ed.),
India. La democracia de la diversidad, Cuadernos de la Fundación Marcelino Botín, No.
11, Observatorio de Análisis y Tendencias, 2008, pp. 223-255.
(27) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Pakistán, armas nucleares y seguridad», Política Exterior,
No. 122, March-April 2008, pp. 111-122.
(28) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Pakistán y el doctor Khan: del orgullo a la clemencia»,
Política Exterior, No. 98, March-April 2004, pp. 7-13.
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