Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

Eduardo Serra Rexach
which ought to take charge of the situation as soon as possible, shows no
signs of being willing or able to do so.
Robles maintains that our presence in Afghanistan is absolutely necessary
in order to achieve an aim which, as President Obama puts it, is to
make possible if not victory at least an acceptable solution.
The author describes the scenario as a set of concentric circles, the
innermost of which is the military situation which, as stated, has gradually
worsened. A substantial increase in troops is therefore crucial, and such
an increase has already been announced. Also needed is a new strategy
against the Taliban insurgency, a difficult and dangerous enemy as they
are an explosive mixture of holy war, Pashtu nationalism, and insurgency
and propagandistic tactics that make them a highly attractive cause to the
whole of Islamic radicalism. Nevertheless, the Taliban are still viewed by
the Afghan people as a hazard to be avoided, and therefore the worst message
we could convey to this population is that international presence will
be short lived, as if they see the Taliban as likely victors, the population’s
adherence to their cause would be tremendous; the international presence
and also determination to win is therefore essential. Moving into the
next circle, a major civilian effort is therefore also needed to separate and
distance the Afghan population from the Taliban cause. This will require
new military tactics to bring down the number of civilian victims (the existence
of civilian casualties has undermined support for the international
forces), although this would necessarily correlate with a greater risk for our
own troops. In order for this civilian effort to be possible it is essential to
bring about a radical improvement in security conditions. And so, in this
second political/military circle, it is necessary to step up efforts to restore
the population’s confidence on the one hand in the Afghan government
and on the other in the international troops. This calls for the comprehensive
approach discussed in a previous edition of the Panorama. Naturally
this will require not only a greater civilian presence but also more funds
earmarked to development, especially that of agriculture, which needs to
progress from subsistence farming to productive agriculture following by
export agriculture and could help eradicate the cultivation of opium poppies.
There has even been talk of a Marshall plan for Afghanistan.
This work brings us to the next circle, that of the «regional strategy».
This strategy has already begun and is based on the recognition that
there are two sides to the problem—one being Afghanistan and the other
Pakistan—and that solving it requires both to be addressed.
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