Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the 2010 NPT review conference
The effect of the foregoing on the NPT was the creation of two regimes
with different obligations in the Treaty depending on whether states
were nuclear or non-nuclear states. For non-nuclear-weapon countries a
total ban was established on the manufacture (even on technical assistance),
acquisition, reception (direct or indirect) and/or storage of nuclear
weapons or other explosive nuclear devices (article II). A system was also
established whereby the IAEA could verify their civilian nuclear activities
in order to prevent the diversion of fissionable material employed for peaceful
ends to a banned military purpose (article III).
For their part, the nuclear-weapon states undertook not to transfer
nuclear weapons to any recipient either directly or indirectly and «not in
any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons» (article I). With
respect to disarmament, the Treaty featured a general—and operationally
highly controversial—clause which established the commitment of each
Party to the Treaty «to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control» (article VI).
For the non-nuclear-weapon states, this provision signified that nuclear
disarmament was an integral part of the obligations of the nuclear states
under the NPT. On the contrary, the US and the USSR (it should be
remembered that France and China did not sign the NPT until 1992) gave
an a posteriori interpretation of the commitments relating to the cessation
of the arms race and disarmament, pointing out that the article in question
neither referred exclusively to the nuclear countries nor required the conclusion
of agreements on disarmament and that it failed to establish the
manner of conducting such agreements («in good faith») or a specific date
for this («early» but not even «as soon as possible») (18).
In the paragraph on the application of the nuclear safeguards, the
resulting commitment was also uneven, as these safeguards would not be
applied to the military activities of the nuclear-weapon states. America’s
President Johnson made a unilateral statement on 2 December 1967 pointing
out that the IAEA safeguard system would be applied to «all nuclear
activities in the United States excluding only those with direct national
(18) On the United States’ defence of these arguments see the statement by Stephen
Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, US compliance with article VI
of the NPT, 3 February 2005. http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0502/doc13.htm
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