Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the 2010 NPT review conference
the League of Arab States, the African Union, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and
partner states, to cite a few examples, in addition to the particular national
stances of many states).
In October 2009 Pierre Goldschmidt, an analyst at the prestigious
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, delivered a paper thoughtprovokingly
entitled «The future of the NPT: should it be enhanced,
changed or replaced?» at an international seminar on the NPT in Rio de
Janeiro. The conclusion he reached was that the Treaty should be fully
implemented and furthermore enforced, as it will only be effective if the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is able to detect undeclared
nuclear material and activities (2). Goldschmidt thus placed emphasis on
another of the key aspects which will be very much present at the 2010
NPT Review Conference: the legal authority of the IAEA to conduct special
inspections with a view to detecting the possible existence of undeclared
unlawful activities in States Parties to the Treaty(3).
Attention at the conference will be centred, on the one hand, on the
commitments achieved at the last two successful Treaty review conferences
(not including that of 2005, which was a total flop) (4): that of
1995 (review and indefinite extension of NPT) and that of 2000, where
an action plan was adopted towards nuclear disarmament, set out in a
list of «13 practical steps». But on the other, some de iure (5) nuclear
powers (headed by the United Kingdom, France and, until very recently,
the US, which has yet to specify the contents of its proposal for bilateral
nuclear disarmament with Russia and which in turn depends on its
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)) have a vested interest in having the 2010
conference focus on the aspects related to the strict compliance by all
states (clearly in allusion to the cases of North Korea and, in particular
(2) The full text of the paper may be consulted at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/
goldschmidt_riopaper.pdf.
(3) For an analysis of this issue see the report by the /IAEA, Reinforcing the Global Nuclear
Order for Peace and Prosperity. The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond. Report
prepared by an independent Commission at the request of the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, May 2008.
(4) On the results of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V.,
Cuatro semanas de mayo, cinco años por delante: el fracaso de la VII Conferencia de
Revisión del TNP, Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI), Nº 72/2005, 7 June 2005. http://
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/756.asp.
(5) The NPT considers a nuclear weapon state to be «one which has manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967»
(art. IX.3). Hence the difference between de iure nuclear-weapon state, Party to the
Treaty, and de facto nuclear-weapon state but nuclear power (India, Pakistan and Israel,
although the latter has never conducted a nuclear test).
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