Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the 2010 NPT review conference
conference were incapable, after four weeks of debating, of agreeing on a
final document embodying the main commitments adopted at the previous
two review conferences, that of 1995 and, particularly, that of 2000(39).
There were three main causes for the overriding feeling of a «wasted
opportunity»: firstly, the participating states’ lack of determination when
dealing with substantial Treaty issues (they took more than two weeks to
define the work programme of the conference); secondly, the attitude of
some states (especially those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement)
which, far from seeking consensus, repeatedly attempted to implement an
«all or nothing» policy; and thirdly, the perception of the nuclear countries
that the agreements achieved in 2000 went much further than what they
were prepared to accept. During the conference the debates were focused
on several issues, such as North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and the
disputes over whether Iran had violated the Treaty.
Special mention should be given to the position of the League of
Arab States and also that of Egypt, which many openly accused of being
chiefly to blame for the fact that the conference was unable to adopt a
final document by consensus. The League of Arab States stated from the
outset (and Egypt was entrusted with defending this position) that their
main priority during the conference was to promote the establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the commitments
adopted in 1995 and reiterated at the 2000 Conference. Bearing
in mind that Israel is the only state in the region that has not yet acceded
to the NPT and that it refuses to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA
safeguards, the League of Arab States, and Egypt in particular, made a
proposal to the Conference by means of a «missive» of acceptance or
blockade of the final document, and called on all the States Parties to
the Treaty to undertake «not to transfer nuclear-related equipment, information,
material and facilities, resources or devices, or assistance in the
nuclear field to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and
has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards»
(40). The imposition of sanctions on Israel thus became the main cause for
the lack of advancement of the different committees and their disastrous
consequences.
(39) On the results of the 2005 NPT Review Conference see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V.,
«Cuatro semanas de mayo, cinco años por delante: el fracaso de la VII Conferencia de
Revisión del TNP», Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI), No. 72/2005, 7 June 2005.
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/756.asp.
(40) () Document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.40
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