Strategic Panorama 2009 - 2010 - IEEE

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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the 2010 NPT review conference manner in which the decision had been adopted, according to the US counterproliferation procedure: a bilateral proposal to the most favourable allies and, if appropriate, facilitation of «multilateralisation» if the other Member States so wished, but never before, in order to prevent delays in its unilateral programming. To these objections was added Russian pressure over the measure and some NATO states’ misgivings about counter proliferation in case it ended up superseding non-proliferation. From the technical viewpoint the objections expressed reservations about the possibility of Iran ending up having long-range missiles and about the feasibility of the system as the results of the tests were disparate and not known in detail (46). Tension reached a head in February 2007 at the 43rd Conference on Security Policy in Munich, when Vladimir Putin accused George W. Bush of encouraging nuclear proliferation (47) and the US of being «unilateralist in using the threat of Russia to conduct its wars and install a missile shield in Europe» (48). To Russia (and China), the real aim of the deployment of the missile shield was none other than to undermine the deterrent capability of Russia’s arsenal; indeed, they held that the early warning radar system actually aimed to control possible launches of Russian ballistic missiles. Moscow retaliated by announcing that it would install missiles in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad at the border with Poland and that it would withdraw from all the armaments control agreements to which it was party, among them, in addition to the START II Treaty (following the US denunciation of the ABM Treaty in 2002), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE, the implementation of which was suspended on 14 July 2007), while also threatening to denounce the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 (INF). Russia thus made the future of the treaties on armaments control and disarmament conditional upon the US missile defence system and, especially, the European architecture of the system in Czech and Polish territories. In strategic terms, Russia announced that, by allowing the system on their soil, both states could be the «target» of an attack with Russian missiles. (46) ARTEGA, Félix, «La contraproliferación» in GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V. (coord.), Respuestas al resto de la proliferación, Documentos de Seguridad y Defensa, No. 27, CESEDEN-Ministerio de Defensa, Madrid, 2009, p. 96. (47) «Putin acusa a Bush de fomentar la proliferación nuclear», El País, 11 February 2007, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Putin/acusa/Bush/fomentar/proliferacion/ nuclear/elpepuint/ 20070211elpepiint_3/Tes. (48) «Misiles de Putin contra EE UU», Revista Cambio 16, 26 February 2007. — 206 —
Vicente Garrido Rebolledo PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA’S PROPOSALS FOR GLOBAL DISAR- MAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION INITIATIVES On 5 April 2009 (the same day North Korea launched a long-range missile), Barack Obama announced «with conviction» in a speech delivered in the centre of Prague «America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons». He stated that «as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act […] to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons» and that «together we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation» in order to «put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that create» nuclear weapons (49). In particular, President Obama described the «trajectory we need to be on» in order to achieve «a world without nuclear weapons»: «To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same». Not that the idea of a «world without nuclear weapons» is entirely new, as it is basically the ultimate aim of the NPT, envisaged as a legally binding commitment in article VI (even though the date established is no more specific than «early» and the legal obligations no more specific than «in good faith»). However, at the opposite end of the scale, there are many who question compliance with the disarmament and non-proliferation commitments announced by President Obama and, above all, the difficulty of specifying them by the time of the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. The first consequence of this appeal was the negotiation of a new Russian-US Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty (signed in 1991 and in force until 5 December 2009). For more than four decades, nuclear parity (and, by extension, also chemical but not biological parity owing to the shortage of specific data on their programmes and biological capabilities) between the USSR/Russia and the US was one of the main pillars of relations between the two countries. The first round of talks on the new Treaty took place on 19-20 May 2009. Since then eight rounds of consultations and intense negotiations have been held between the two countries (the most recent on 9 (49) Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 5 de abril de 2009, http://www.whitehouse. gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/. — 207 —
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MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA SPANISH INSTI
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DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INSTITUTION
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INTRODUCTION
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Introduction included a chapter on
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Introduction To this end he propose
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Introduction II The economic crisis
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Introduction 4. Negotiation of new
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THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND ITS IMPACT
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Federico Steinberg Whesler CHART 3
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CHAPTER TWO CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS
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Climate change and its security imp
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CHAPTER THREE INTERNATIONAL RELATIO
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International relations and the new
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THE AF PAK SCENARIO Jo s é Ma r í
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José María Robles Fraga dangerous
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THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE COMMON
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