Technical b r Report - International Military Testing Association

did not -- was the n~,jor reason the categories found from the two studies
did not map even btttrer onto one another.
Two categories in I‘able V probably require some additional comments,
as Lhey might seem to s+rbstantiatr? scrm~ of :!le reservations held concerning
subordinate ratings;. these are the categories labeled: Discipline, and Over
Familiarity with Subordinates. The incidents under Discipline typically
mentioned punishment of a group. For instance, “Punishment was given to
the whole radio gang by rcscinding,spccial liberty when one individual was
at fault far not delivering a Ceisagc’,” was one of the incidents in this
categoi y. Inciden:s in the category labeled Over Familiarity with Subordinates,
all roierred fo cases in Gricil junior officers bypassed senior
enlisted r.:en in the ch.lin of comm;ruc! Uiicn dealing with enlisted men. The
individtul reporting such an itzzide:!; app.-lrt?ntly felt tl~e chair. of command
V;JS bypassed bacause the junior ufficr?r WS too familiar with some of the
junior enlisted men, and that this hindcred mission accomplishment.
_ AS w.rs the case oi t!,c first study, none of the critical incidents
gathered dl*ring the second study sccotxd of a petty nature. Instead, they
usanl iy address& periorn:uxcs : !~.tt thi> .;avy uould ci:her r;ish to reward
or cxt Lnguish. S+ith.zr study providc‘d support for the no:ion that subordincLe
rarillgs would be greaily inilucnced bv officers adapting strategies
of ingrar iatiun in de.11 kg with Lhrbir sLbordi:latrs.
Discussion I
scars.
Tile use of suhardinate ratings h.ts been discussed for mAny, many
Dased on armchair analzrses oi the topic. it hss bren pointed
out that subordinsccs hre inpa position to observe some of the performance
of their supervisors. In m:uly cases titk subordinate is in a unique
positiott which ai fords him opportunity LO observe supervisory performance
that, is inaccessible to orhers. Assuming that more iniormation available
c’oncer:ting various .~spc?cts of a supk*rvisors p+rformance will permit a
better ev,jluaLit)n r*i his over nil performance1 it follows that subordinate
rat ittgs s!~ulJ b+: used. But evc~ Lttot~~it this w:rs all pointed out long
.tgo, subordinate r;f~i::gs have nut bwn utiliz *d in practI.ce. This non-use
is cvidcntly based on the conceptions of a “ pularity game”. limited
perspective, etc.
II
?‘Iw most signiiisant finding of our critical incident studies in
this area, i s 1 hat Ltw bases used by subordjnat cs ior their evnluat ions
of their superiors were not consistent witf d such conceptions. They were:
for t!tc nust p;irL, based on aspects on which mo:-t supervisors t;ould want -.
to be rated. The n.3vzl oif icers. who as part of their academic training,
Sathered the critical incident information for us were originally suspicious
.\f, fearful oi, and gcncrally opposed to, subordin3te ratings
prior t0 their w,>rk in this area. iitcir switc!l in attitude after having
gather-4 and nnaIysed r!le critical incident information was dramatic.
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