Willard Van Orman Quine

132 peter hylton
are made and justified on what is, seen very abstractly, the same sort
of basis. Even if we can distinguish changes of language from changes
of theory within a language, there is no reason to say that we have a
notion of correctness for changes of the one kind but not for changes
of the other. Changes of language would, at least in principle, be as
much matters of correctness as changes of theory within a language,
for all changes would be justified by appeal to the overarching aim
of achieving a simple and empirically correct theory of the world.
Hence there is no reason to invoke the principle of tolerance.
The rejection of the principle of tolerance makes all the difference
to the status of ontology. For Carnap, the question whether we should
use Newtonian or relativistic mechanics was a question of choice of
language and therefore a matter for free choice rather than a rightor-wrong
issue. For Quine, it is also perhaps largely a question of
language but not therefore a matter for free choice. The language
of relativistic mechanics makes possible a preferable theory and is
therefore a better choice. Language relativity, after all, does not arise
merely from the existence of a multiplicity of distinct languages,
any more than the (supposed) relativity of ethics arises merely from
the existence of a multiplicity of opinions on that subject. What is
required is, in addition, the idea that there is no basis for choosing
one as better than another and that therefore a relativized answer is
the best we can achieve. In rejecting the principle of tolerance, Quine
rejects just this sort of relativism about language choice.
The upshot of this is a general rejection of Carnap’s relativism,
most clearly seen, perhaps, in the case of truth. We no longer say, with
Carnap, that so-and-so is true relative to the choice of such-and-such
language. It is because of his doubts about the distinction between
language and beliefs accepted within a language that Quine generally
speaks simply of “theory,” meaning all the sentences that we accept.
He recognizes, of course, that various theories are possible, but he
denies that this makes for relativity. If a sentence is part of the theory
that we hold, then we accept that sentence as true – not true in some
relativized sense but flat-out. (This does not show, of course, that
we will not later change our minds. Nothing, in Quine’s view, can
rule this out; he is a fallibilist through and through.) That is simply
what it is to hold a theory, and since we cannot get by without some
theory or other to guide us through the world, we must hold the
best we can. Having said that we can only make sense of the idea
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