Willard Van Orman Quine
Willard Van Orman Quine
Willard Van Orman Quine
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<strong>Quine</strong> and Logical Positivism 229<br />
that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give<br />
syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments. (1937, 51)<br />
Note that Carnap’s notion of language is richer than the usual one<br />
and includes both formation rules, which constitute the grammar of<br />
the language, and transformation rules, the axioms of the system.<br />
The only constraint is pragmatic, what advances the science carried<br />
out in these languages.<br />
On the account just given, Carnap was forced to his tolerant conventionalism<br />
by the need to uphold a weaker form of analyticity than<br />
that given by explicit definition. But there is overdetermination here,<br />
and the principle of tolerance chimes well with the Vienna Circle’s<br />
antimetaphysical rejection of pseudoproblems in philosophy. The<br />
fruitless debates that had raged in the 1920s between Hilbert and<br />
Brouwer and their followers could not be rejected out of hand, since<br />
the leading protagonists were two of the greatest mathematicians of<br />
their time. But here, it seemed, was a way of resolving, or better, dissolving,<br />
the apparent issues between them. Whether tolerance does<br />
or does not achieve this result has been disputed, but Carnap and his<br />
followers were certainly convinced that it did and thus had a positive<br />
reason for holding to it.<br />
Espousing tolerance was not by itself enough to save analyticity<br />
for mathematics in the face of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem.<br />
Carnap had also, in effect, to replace logical deduction by logical consequence.<br />
Tarski is generally credited with discovering the correct<br />
notion of logical consequence, but Carnap himself achieved that for<br />
two particular languages he investigated in The Logical Syntax of<br />
Language. What he did not achieve was a completely general account<br />
of this key notion that could be applied uniformly to a wide<br />
class of languages. Nonetheless, his accomplishment on this score<br />
is considerable. By his notion of rules of consequence, as opposed<br />
to rules of deduction, he arrived at truth definitions for his formal<br />
languages I and II (for a detailed assessment of the semantic content<br />
of The Logical Syntax of Language, see Coffa 1987, 285–326).<br />
3. “rudolf carnap, teacher and friend”<br />
In September 1932 <strong>Willard</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Orman</strong> <strong>Quine</strong> arrived in Vienna. Aged<br />
24, he had completed his Ph.D. at Harvard the previous spring, in his<br />
second year as a graduate student, and had been awarded a one-year<br />
Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006