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Willard Van Orman Quine

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<strong>Quine</strong> and Logical Positivism 229<br />

that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give<br />

syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments. (1937, 51)<br />

Note that Carnap’s notion of language is richer than the usual one<br />

and includes both formation rules, which constitute the grammar of<br />

the language, and transformation rules, the axioms of the system.<br />

The only constraint is pragmatic, what advances the science carried<br />

out in these languages.<br />

On the account just given, Carnap was forced to his tolerant conventionalism<br />

by the need to uphold a weaker form of analyticity than<br />

that given by explicit definition. But there is overdetermination here,<br />

and the principle of tolerance chimes well with the Vienna Circle’s<br />

antimetaphysical rejection of pseudoproblems in philosophy. The<br />

fruitless debates that had raged in the 1920s between Hilbert and<br />

Brouwer and their followers could not be rejected out of hand, since<br />

the leading protagonists were two of the greatest mathematicians of<br />

their time. But here, it seemed, was a way of resolving, or better, dissolving,<br />

the apparent issues between them. Whether tolerance does<br />

or does not achieve this result has been disputed, but Carnap and his<br />

followers were certainly convinced that it did and thus had a positive<br />

reason for holding to it.<br />

Espousing tolerance was not by itself enough to save analyticity<br />

for mathematics in the face of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem.<br />

Carnap had also, in effect, to replace logical deduction by logical consequence.<br />

Tarski is generally credited with discovering the correct<br />

notion of logical consequence, but Carnap himself achieved that for<br />

two particular languages he investigated in The Logical Syntax of<br />

Language. What he did not achieve was a completely general account<br />

of this key notion that could be applied uniformly to a wide<br />

class of languages. Nonetheless, his accomplishment on this score<br />

is considerable. By his notion of rules of consequence, as opposed<br />

to rules of deduction, he arrived at truth definitions for his formal<br />

languages I and II (for a detailed assessment of the semantic content<br />

of The Logical Syntax of Language, see Coffa 1987, 285–326).<br />

3. “rudolf carnap, teacher and friend”<br />

In September 1932 <strong>Willard</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Orman</strong> <strong>Quine</strong> arrived in Vienna. Aged<br />

24, he had completed his Ph.D. at Harvard the previous spring, in his<br />

second year as a graduate student, and had been awarded a one-year<br />

Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006

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