Willard Van Orman Quine

256 daniel isaacson
mathematics, it seems remarkable that he was unaware in writing
it that he had significantly shifted in his position regarding what, by
the account I have developed here, is the central issue for empiricism
(and which impelled the Vienna Circle to move from positivism to
logical positivism). But this passage reads as if he was unaware that he
had shifted his position until Gibson pointed it out to him. Also, if it
is a new position, it seems strange not to identify the motivation for
the shift by explaining why the earlier position had to be abandoned.
But all he does is “rest with the later position.” On the other hand,
perhaps he misspoke himself in this reply, and where he said ‘later
position’ should have said ‘later formulation’ (i.e., stated that what
he had written in the passage in question is a better way to express
a long-held position).
These two possibilities (that the new passage is just a better formulation
of a long-held position vs. that it marks the radical abandonment
of what seemed to be the point of real difference between
himself and Carnap) are not dichotomous. There is also the possibility
that the passage expresses a new position but one that is consonant
with the main elements of Quine’s philosophy overall. But
clearly this is not the place to embark on a detailed investigation
into Quine’s account of mathematics. 35
5. conclusion
In considering the relation between Quine and logical positivism, we
have naturally focused on the relation between Quine and Carnap.
Insofar as Quine held that mathematics, when applied, has empirical
content, there is a substantive philosophical difference between
Quine’s and Carnap’s views, one that turns centrally on acceptance
versus rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Quine’s philosophy
remains true to the spirit of positivism, going back to its early
progenitors, especially Comte, and differs in this important way from
that of Carnap and the logical positivists.
If, as some of his late writings suggest, Quine’s position was ultimately
that mathematics has no empirical content, the difference
between him and Carnap becomes much less clear. If Quine was
prepared to agree with Carnap (and all logical positivists) that mathematics
lacks empirical content, then his use of holism was not
clearly different from Carnap’s. The way may then be open to sustain
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