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Willard Van Orman Quine

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<strong>Quine</strong> and Logical Positivism 247<br />

being established on an empiricist basis means being grounded, ultimately,<br />

in the evidence of our senses. If the analytic-synthetic distinction<br />

cannot be established on an empiricist basis, then it is untenable,<br />

because philosophy does not stand separate from science.<br />

Science is grounded in the evidence of our senses, and <strong>Quine</strong> has<br />

arguments to show that the analytic-synthetic distinction cannot be<br />

so grounded. This is a tenable position. But the crucial question, in<br />

relation to the debate with Carnap, is whether it is a compelling<br />

position. I think it is not.<br />

For Carnap, philosophy is the logic of science. Science determines<br />

what that logic should be, not normatively, but pragmatically, in the<br />

sense of what maximizes our chances for scientific success. This determination<br />

constitutes a favoring of one logic over another. What it<br />

is to be a logic is prior to any such determination. It is how we lay<br />

out the options for scientific language. Carnap’s principle of logical<br />

tolerance enshrines the freedom we have to explore our options for<br />

scientific language. But the very basis of its operation is the analyticsynthetic<br />

distinction, by which we distinguish between science on<br />

the one hand and logical syntax (later, also semantics) on the other.<br />

Syntax and semantics constitute the conventions of scientific language,<br />

which we pragmatically choose. Philosophy, as the logical<br />

syntax (and semantics) of language, itself depends on the analyticsynthetic<br />

distinction. At the same time, this conception of philosophy<br />

validates the analytic-synthetic distinction: If philosophy is the<br />

logical syntax and semantics of language, then its subject is that part<br />

of our knowledge that is analytic.<br />

What this analysis of <strong>Quine</strong>’s and Carnap’s positions shows is that<br />

neither can address the other within his own conception of philosophy.<br />

Their debate comes down, rather, to a take-it-or-leave-it standoff.<br />

The marker of their differing conceptions of philosophy is the<br />

analytic-synthetic distinction.<br />

Despite the fact that within their positions there is no basis for winning<br />

one side over to the other, the impasse can be broken by testing<br />

each position by the criterion of success in accounting for mathematics,<br />

the hard case for empiricism. <strong>Quine</strong> considered that holism<br />

provided an account of mathematics as imbibing empirical content<br />

from the confirmed theories in which it figures. Carnap espoused<br />

holism, but not to this effect, and analyticity of mathematics is<br />

the cornerstone of his philosophy of mathematics. The tenability<br />

Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006

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