Willard Van Orman Quine

38 robert j. fogelin
but what they contribute to our overall theory of the world as neutral modes
in its logical structure. (FSS 74–5)
In a section of Pursuit of Truth entitled “Ontology Defused,” Quine
makes the same point this way: “A lesson of proxy functions is that
our ontology, like grammar, is part of our own conceptual contribution
to our theory of the world” (PTb 36).
These passages – and there are many more like them throughout
Quine’s writings – capture one of his central ideas: Ontological commitments
are not only posits but, as we might put it, insubstantial
posits. They are nothing more than neutral nodes in the logic of a
theoretical structure. In various places – for example, in the opening
pages of “Ontological Relativity” – Quine suggests that this view of
ontology is forced on us when we adopt a naturalistic standpoint. It
is, however, far from obvious why this is so. For instance, consider
the following two theses:
1. RP: Independent of us, the world contains all sorts of objects;
which ones we take seriously is a function of our theoretical
concerns.
2. ARP: Objects are posits (reifications, fictions) that we introduce
as part of our theoretical activities.
Both views are pluralistic in acknowledging the legitimacy of using
a wide range of referring terms as part of our theoretical apparatus.
The first, however, expresses a realist position (RP), the second
an antirealist position (ARP). Though Quine has no qualms about
countenancing peculiar objects, such as large discontinuous particulars
as the referents of mass nouns, deep down, throughout his
career, he was committed to some form of the second, antirealist,
thesis.
The first point to make is that the possibility of constructing proxy
functions (e.g., cosmic complements) does not determine a choice
between RP and ARP. The realist will say that Quine’s cosmic complement
(unlike Pegasus) is an object that really does exist – it is
simply not a particularly interesting object from a scientific standpoint.
Second, and more importantly, there seems to be no way of
choosing between RP and ARP on the basis of empirical content.
If that is so, then the thoroughgoing naturalist in philosophy should
set aside the debate between realism and antirealism as unresolvable
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