25.12.2012 Views

Willard Van Orman Quine

Willard Van Orman Quine

Willard Van Orman Quine

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

<strong>Quine</strong> on the Intelligibility and Relevance of Analyticity 51<br />

if consistent, have a model in any denumerable domain. Similarly,<br />

Carnap’s artificial systems forfeit the claim to be about language unless<br />

there are behavioral criteria at least waiting in the wings. This is<br />

what <strong>Quine</strong> means in saying that Carnap’s artificial languages could<br />

clarify analyticity but only if “the mental or behavioral or cultural<br />

factors relevant to analyticity – whatever they may be – were somehow<br />

sketched into the simplified model” (TDEa 34).<br />

This <strong>Quine</strong>an response seems to me to be utterly convincing. If<br />

the analytic-synthetic distinction is to be viable at all, there must<br />

be somehow some behavioral criteria for analyticity. Yet, although<br />

we will concede this point on Carnap’s behalf (and, it would seem,<br />

against his protests), the question of whether <strong>Quine</strong> has an argument<br />

against the intelligibility of analyticity that ought to be convincing is<br />

not thereby settled. We need first to achieve a better understanding of<br />

the demands for behavioral criteria by determining what is required<br />

for (and what would count as) satisfying them. In short, <strong>Quine</strong> has<br />

raised a good and legitimate issue, but it still needs to be clarified.<br />

Even then the fate of analyticity would not be settled until we come<br />

to a conclusion about the prospects for meeting those demands once<br />

they are clarified. Only if we could reasonably conclude (and the<br />

argument need not be airtight) that there were no such prospects<br />

should we take Hume’s inflammatory advice given at the end of the<br />

Enquiry. 3<br />

<strong>Quine</strong>’s demand for behavioral criteria derives both its legitimacy<br />

and its content from the empiricist tradition of formulating criteria<br />

of empirical significance. One is forced to the idea that the content<br />

comes from that tradition because <strong>Quine</strong> himself is very inexplicit<br />

about the details of his own demand. Presumably, the demand is of<br />

the sort that would be reasonable for any theoretical term in empirical<br />

science. This already tells us a fair bit. For one thing, the criteria<br />

need not amount to a full definition of analyticity. Theoretical<br />

terms are, in general, not definable in the observational framework.<br />

The desired connection is a looser one, allowing what is observable<br />

to count as evidence for or against the theoretical claim. Second, the<br />

behavioral criteria need not be given for analyticity directly. Often<br />

the various terms of a theoretical framework are so tightly bound<br />

up with one another that supplying observational criteria for one<br />

term serves to provide adequately for all. The theory of meaning is<br />

no exception. <strong>Quine</strong> is content to say that the various terms from<br />

Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!