Willard Van Orman Quine
Willard Van Orman Quine
Willard Van Orman Quine
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210 dagfinn føllesdal<br />
just mentioned, then quantification works whatever kind of<br />
objects one quantifies over.<br />
As we noted earlier, Church argued that one can quantify<br />
into modal contexts provided the quantifier has an intensional<br />
range – a range, for instance, composed of attributes<br />
rather than classes. However, what saves his “logic of sense<br />
and denotation” from collapse is not this feature but the<br />
Frege-inspired reference shift that takes place within modal<br />
contexts: What object a variable takes as value depends<br />
on the modal operators (or, in Church’s case, modal predicates)<br />
within whose scope it occurs. Thanks to this feature,<br />
Church’s system does not have any opaque contexts. All its<br />
contexts are referentially and extensionally transparent, and<br />
there is no need to have a two-sorted semantics in order to<br />
prevent a collapse of modal distinctions. Although it uses<br />
symbols like ‘⊓’, Church’s system is not a system of modal<br />
logic; instead, it is a purely extensional system.<br />
Carnap proposes in Meaning and Necessity (1947) a system<br />
of modal logic, S2, where, in effect, he interprets the<br />
quantifiers as ranging over intensions. (This is not clear from<br />
his presentation, since he operates with two “identity” relations,<br />
identity of extension ‘≡’ and identity of intension<br />
‘=’, where ‘a ≡ b’ is defined as ‘N(a ≡ b)’. However, only<br />
identity of intension has the properties characteristic of an<br />
identity relation.) Carnap states that “in order to avoid certain<br />
complications, which cannot be explained here, it seems<br />
advisable to admit in S, only descriptions which do not contain<br />
‘N’.” 6 Carnap never mentioned what the complications<br />
are. He may not have discovered that one of them was the<br />
collapse of modal distinctions. If so, he might have seen, as<br />
<strong>Quine</strong> saw later, that the root of the trouble is singular terms<br />
that contain descriptive elements.<br />
The first systems of quantified modal logic that were proposed<br />
had no singular terms other than variables. Since variables<br />
keep their reference from one possible world to another,<br />
the collapse discussed by <strong>Quine</strong> was not brought to the fore<br />
until one got systems of quantified logic that included singular<br />
terms other than variables.<br />
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