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Willard Van Orman Quine

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210 dagfinn føllesdal<br />

just mentioned, then quantification works whatever kind of<br />

objects one quantifies over.<br />

As we noted earlier, Church argued that one can quantify<br />

into modal contexts provided the quantifier has an intensional<br />

range – a range, for instance, composed of attributes<br />

rather than classes. However, what saves his “logic of sense<br />

and denotation” from collapse is not this feature but the<br />

Frege-inspired reference shift that takes place within modal<br />

contexts: What object a variable takes as value depends<br />

on the modal operators (or, in Church’s case, modal predicates)<br />

within whose scope it occurs. Thanks to this feature,<br />

Church’s system does not have any opaque contexts. All its<br />

contexts are referentially and extensionally transparent, and<br />

there is no need to have a two-sorted semantics in order to<br />

prevent a collapse of modal distinctions. Although it uses<br />

symbols like ‘⊓’, Church’s system is not a system of modal<br />

logic; instead, it is a purely extensional system.<br />

Carnap proposes in Meaning and Necessity (1947) a system<br />

of modal logic, S2, where, in effect, he interprets the<br />

quantifiers as ranging over intensions. (This is not clear from<br />

his presentation, since he operates with two “identity” relations,<br />

identity of extension ‘≡’ and identity of intension<br />

‘=’, where ‘a ≡ b’ is defined as ‘N(a ≡ b)’. However, only<br />

identity of intension has the properties characteristic of an<br />

identity relation.) Carnap states that “in order to avoid certain<br />

complications, which cannot be explained here, it seems<br />

advisable to admit in S, only descriptions which do not contain<br />

‘N’.” 6 Carnap never mentioned what the complications<br />

are. He may not have discovered that one of them was the<br />

collapse of modal distinctions. If so, he might have seen, as<br />

<strong>Quine</strong> saw later, that the root of the trouble is singular terms<br />

that contain descriptive elements.<br />

The first systems of quantified modal logic that were proposed<br />

had no singular terms other than variables. Since variables<br />

keep their reference from one possible world to another,<br />

the collapse discussed by <strong>Quine</strong> was not brought to the fore<br />

until one got systems of quantified logic that included singular<br />

terms other than variables.<br />

Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006

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