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Willard Van Orman Quine

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Aspects of <strong>Quine</strong>’s Naturalized Epistemology 31<br />

� Naturalized empiricism. The traditional empiricist view<br />

that all knowledge of the world around us is derived from information<br />

provided by the senses is transformed into a claim<br />

about hits on sensory surfaces. (Here we could also speak of<br />

empiricism externalized.)<br />

� Naturalized logical empiricism. This is the logical empiricist’s<br />

view that the philosophy of empirical science takes as<br />

its subject matter the language of empirical science, with<br />

the difference that this enterprise is taken to be itself empirical<br />

rather than merely conceptual and is pursued in a holist<br />

rather that in a reductionist manner.<br />

Returning to “Epistemology Naturalized,” we might note that the<br />

transition from a general defense of naturalized epistemology to a defense<br />

of his own naturalized version of logical empiricism occurs in<br />

a rather subtle fashion. Having recorded the failure of reductionist<br />

programs in both their strong and weak forms, <strong>Quine</strong> pauses to reflect<br />

on the reasons for this failure. One possibility, he tells us, is<br />

that “the implications of a typical statement about bodies are too<br />

complex for finite axiomatization, however lengthy” (EN 79). This<br />

is the view that reductionism, though theoretically sound, is in fact<br />

impossible to carry through to completion. Rejecting this, <strong>Quine</strong> offers<br />

his own diagnosis of the failure of reductionist programs of the<br />

kind put forward by logical empiricists:<br />

I have a different explanation. It is that the typical statement about bodies<br />

has no fund of experiential implications it can call its own. A substantial<br />

mass of theory, taken together, will commonly have experiential implications;<br />

this is how we make verifiable predictions. We may not be able to<br />

explain why we arrive at theories which make successful predictions, but<br />

we do arrive at such theories. (EN 79)<br />

In this passage, <strong>Quine</strong> returns to one of the fundamental themes<br />

of “Two Dogmas,” but now expressed with more modesty. In “Two<br />

Dogmas,” <strong>Quine</strong> famously declared,<br />

The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science....Any statement<br />

can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments....Conversely...nostatement<br />

is immune to revision. (TDEb 42–3)<br />

Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006

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