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Willard Van Orman Quine

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<strong>Willard</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Orman</strong> <strong>Quine</strong> 17<br />

is not merely underdetermined but indeterminate. (See Chapter 5<br />

for a discussion of <strong>Quine</strong>’s thesis of indeterminacy of terms.) In<br />

what sense is the translation of theoretical sentences indeterminate?<br />

In the sense that the same foreign sentence can be translated<br />

equally well by two (or more) different home language sentences. 1<br />

This is the core idea of <strong>Quine</strong>’s famous thesis of indeterminacy of<br />

translation.<br />

But if indeterminacy is accepted, then sentence meanings do not<br />

have identity conditions and therefore cannot serve as propositions<br />

or as objectively valid translation relations, for there is no entity<br />

without identity. <strong>Quine</strong>’s argument assumes, reasonably enough,<br />

that a necessary condition for the identity of propositions is as follows:<br />

If P1, P2, and P3 are propositions, then if P1 = P2 and P1 = P3,<br />

then P2 = P3. But this is just the identity condition that indeterminacy<br />

of translation shows that sentence meanings lack. Consider: if<br />

S1, S2, and S3 are sentence meanings, then if S1 = S2 and S1 = S3,<br />

it does not follow that S2 = S3. In <strong>Quine</strong>’s own words, “What the<br />

indeterminacy of translation shows is the notion of propositions as<br />

sentence meanings is untenable” (PTb 102). Finally, note that the indeterminacy<br />

of translation is not a problem confronting translation;<br />

in particular, it is not the claim that some sentences are untranslatable.<br />

On the contrary, it is the claim that some sentences have<br />

more than one acceptable translation. Thus indeterminacy is good<br />

news, not bad news. (See Chapter 6 for an in-depth analysis and<br />

evaluation of <strong>Quine</strong>’s indeterminacy thesis, and see Chapter 1 for<br />

the claim that <strong>Quine</strong>’s thought experiment of radical translation is<br />

inconsistent with his professed naturalism.)<br />

summary and conclusion<br />

As we have seen, <strong>Quine</strong> regarded himself to be a systematic thinker<br />

insofar as the bulk of his philosophy, to include his repudiation of the<br />

two dogmas of empiricism (viz., the analytic-synthetic distinction,<br />

and reductionism), and his advocacy of moderate holism, underdetermination<br />

of physical theory, and indeterminacy of translation,<br />

as well as his advocacy of physicalism and empiricism, consists in<br />

corollaries of his naturalism and extensionalism. This systematic<br />

philosophy established <strong>Quine</strong> as the most influential philosopher of<br />

the latter half of the twentieth century: his philosophical interests<br />

Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006

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