THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SATANIC CULT INVOLVEMENT: AN ...

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12.5 The ego and the self in object relations theory and analytical psychology
One last conceptual difficulty needs to be confronted before discussing the application of
an archetypal object relations model to satanic cult phenomena, i.e., the notion ofthe ego
and its relationship to defence mechanisms. Whereas object relations theorists tend to
use the term ego to refer to the personality as a whole, and use the concepts of ego and
self interchangeably, Jung clearly differentiated between ego and self. Jung equated the
ego with consciousness, while perceiving the self to be the executive archetype and
supraordinate unifying principle ofthe total psyche (Samuels, et aI, 1986). Because Jung
uses 'ego' and 'consciousness' interchangeably, the ego must be completely conscious
and totally within consciousness. As Samuels (1985) notes, this is problematic because
"Jung then has no equivalent to the psychoanalytic metapsychological construct of a
super-ego. Nor can he say much about ego defences, which are also unconscious in
operation" (p. 60). A further difficulty arises from the emphasis on the defensive splitting
of the ego in object relations theory, for, as Charlton (1997) observes, the Jungian ego
cannot split.
All of these conceptual discrepancies are potentially resolvable, however, when one
realises that the object relations 'ego' is largely equivalent to the Jungian 'self, which
does employ unconscious defences against internal and external threats (Samuels, et aI,
1986). Thus, although the Jungian ego does not split, the Jungian psyche as a whole is
inevitably split,
because of the nature of the relationship between the ego and the affectimages
of the 'archetypal internal objects' which make up the deepest layers
of the unconscious. The internal objects of the Jungian unconscious are
experienced by the ego as non-self - that is, they appear as unwanted thoughts,
numinous emotions and strange desires (Charlton, 1997, p. 87).
The absence of a Jungian superego is not very problematic for object relations theory
because, in Klein's view at least, "the superego is analysable into a number of internal
figures, known as internal objects, which are themselves in relation to each other as well
as to the ego" (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 94). The related question ofthe origin ofmorality,