North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

Legitimacy
From a structural point of view, legitimacy is defined negatively as the lack of
collectively organized alternatives. 82 Only when collective alternatives are available does
political choice become available to specific individuals. As long as no collective alternatives are
available, individual attitudes toward the regime matter little for its stability.
Legitimacy to the regime originally came from the national liberation ideology and
practice of the first Kim Il-sung government with its anti-colonial, nationalist, and revolutionary
credentials. 83 By the early 1970s, the legitimacy of the political regime was bolstered by the
formalization of the presidential system in 1972, codified by the new constitution.
Kim Chong-il has been the benefactor of a regime that is content to live under the rules
laid down under his father. This has been achieved in large measure by graft and favors to
critical elites. To date, the elite have not felt compelled to challenge the interpretation and rules
that uphold the legitimacy of the Kim Chong-il regime.
Kim Chong-il has already eroded much of this legitimacy by not following the pursuit of
power through legally established channels when he assumed the portfolio of General Secretary
in 1997. By law, the KWP Congress should elect a new CC, which in turn, chooses the General
Secretary. The process for Kim Chong-il, however, took the form of acclamation rather than
election, contrary to normal procedures in NK and other communist states. The actual process
began in September 1997, with a series of provincial and national party conferences, each
culminating in a recommendation that Kim Chong-il be acclaimed General Secretary. A special
communiqué followed on October 8, 1997, issued jointly by the existing CC and the Party’s
CMC, announcing Kim’s election.
Up until now, this violation of party procedures has not led to direct challenges to Kim’s
authority. However, if pressure on the system continues to erode the foundation of privileges that
support the elite, opposition to the dynastic succession, which exists beneath the surface, could
erupt into a struggle for power. In such a struggle, the opposition could seize the initiative by
highlighting Kim’s lack of institutional legitimacy.
The legitimacy of the regime could be called into question as the built-in tendency of
mutual exclusiveness among the ruling apparatus stifles policy coordination and thus weakens
strategy effectiveness. Kim Chong-il’s divide-and-rule tactics have choked inter-agency
cooperation and coordination. Instead, mutual competition has become the new norm of the
82 This concept was put forth by Adam Przeworski in his discussion of political reforms in Eastern Europe; later
cited by Alexandre Mansourov, op. cit.
83 Ibid.
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