North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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Although the future of cellular telephones and the Internet in North Korea is yet uncertain, it would be useful to consider how these media might be used to lengthen our reach to the kind of North Korean elites discussed in this paper. We should consider Internet site content that might be attractive to North Korean elites - IT professionals and researchers like Hwang Tokman. Computer experts should study the technical aspects of using the Internet, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications’ E Mail system, and the Kwangmyong intranet system. We should not ignore the print media. We know that the North Korean government pays attention, particularly to the South Korean press. This information is circulated on a limited basis and probably passed along the rumor chain. South Korean opponents of Kim Jong-il are very active in this regard, but Americans can become more active. Korea is a security, economic, and social priority for the U.S. and we should not shy away from writing about it. Articles in English may have some impact, but National Institute for Public Policy analysts Matthew Polak and Cristen Duncan have demonstrated that it is possible to have articles republished in Korean. 81 Depending on the subject, this kind of activity also enhances the dialog between the United States and its ally, South Korea. More contact and dialog would surely help strained U.S.-ROK relations, but that matter is beyond the scope of this paper. There are, however, a number of relevant diplomatic initiatives that should be considered. Roh Moo-hyun is the elected president of South Korea and he is continuing the sunshine policy toward the North. Despite Washington’s misgivings, we could encourage him in two directions that would lengthen our (U.S. and South Korean) reach into North Korea. First, President Roh should be encouraged to articulate a South Korean vision of an independent, democratic, peaceful, and prosperous Korea. This would help North Koreans grasp an alternative framework for feelings about their government and their country. Second, following Larry Wortzel’s point, South Korea should be encouraged to promote independent small businesses that actively engage North Koreans in free enterprise, consistent with alliance security requirements. In pursuing this, however, we should be mindful that there is a fine line between encouraging North Korean entrepreneurship and providing cash to the Kim Jong-il regime. The latter would be harmful. There also is a diplomatic initiative we could pursue with some of our other allies that have diplomatic relations with North Korea. Their diplomats could begin identifying particularly younger North Korean diplomats who may be quietly part of the new opportunities group 81 Duncan, Cristen, “North Korea’s Nuke Freezing Proposal is a trap – Defense News,” Yonhap News, January 21, 2004, available in Korean at ; Polak, Matthew, “Does Aid Really Reach North Koreans?”, available at . V-22
described by Kongdan Oh. Allied diplomats might then engage these people more purposefully. This would, of course, have to be done within each foreign ministry’s guidelines for diplomatic contact with North Korea. But concerns over guidelines may be eased because the North Korean diplomats of interest are young and generally of a lower rank. The United Nations and other international organizations in which North Korea participates would be the best venues for this sort of effort. Of course, as we have pointed out, not all North Korean diplomats are what they claim to be. There is no point in crafting sophisticated messages for Kim Jong-ils dirty diplomats or Bureau 39 thugs. The way to affect this division of the North Korean elite is to squeeze them. A concerted effort to constrict the money flow will send a message right to Kim Jong-il, and measures can be relaxed or tightened in accordance with the Dear Leader’s behavior or with U.S. policy. Apart from this, stemming the flow of missiles and drugs would be in the interest of the United States, its allies, and its friends. 82 Stemming the flow of Pyongyang’s missile sales is challenging because to a significant degree the sales are legal. Nonetheless, the Bush Administration has demonstrated that the international community can band together for a common purpose under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It should be noted, however, that sporadic harassment is unlikely to be effective; 83 a comprehensive effort is required. The U.S. and its PSI allies need to consider the international legal implications of their strategy and agree upon a common policy. China needs to be pressed to not provide alternate overland routes. And potential recipient countries must understand that there will be consequences for buying North Korean missiles. The PSI can double as a drug interdiction effort, as the recent Australian seizure of the Pong Su shows. 84 And a wider effort to stem the tide of North Korean drugs is liable to garner considerable support among affected countries, if presented as apolitical law enforcement. We could first enlist the support of Australia, Japan, South Korea, and even China; then Southeast Asian countries could be approached with offers of assistance. For example, their police, customs, and coast guard officials have valuable information about North Korean drugs, but often do not have the means to intercept them. With relatively small expenditures, we could assist them with intelligence, organization, and interdiction capabilities. 82 For a discussion of constricting money flows to North Korea, see Stevens, Terry C. with David J. Smith et.al., “Deterring North Korea: U.S. Options,” Comparative Strategy 22(5), December 2003, pp. 503-508. 83 Gertz, Bill, “Ship gets arms in and out,” The Washington Times, February 18, 2003. The December 9, 2002 Spanish detention of the North Korean vessel Sosan and its subsequent release demonstrate the need for careful legal consideration and policy development. It is likely that Kim Jong-il saw this incident as an example of American weakness. 84 “Macao-based organized crime said behind N. Korea heroin trade,” Kyodo News Service, November 19, 2003. V-23
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
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To write accurately about North Kor
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technocrats, provincial and county
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PREFACE This paper will examine in
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ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
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information streams, and from him t
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within the hands of a few individua
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and whether or not he will embarras
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to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
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strengthening of all armed forces,
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esearch institutes and “think tan
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The primary missions of the Reconna
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communication that generally fall o
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of the State Security Department or
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maintaining strict control over the
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agencies in the ROK and Japan began
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The Guard and Security Commands, wh
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eports that are funneled up through
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Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
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Within the military, this dynamic c
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him that all significant orders and
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Until the 1990s, the electronic med
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
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TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
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The factional struggles in North Ko
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A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
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C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
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document control bureaus in each mi
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Originally implemented in 1994 and
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Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
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of associates who trace their relat
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September 9, 2003, showed a change
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Chart II-2: Secretariat 5. Kye Ung-
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Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
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Table II-6. Kim Chong-il’s Princi
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Table II-7. Kim Chong-il’s Person
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chance to unfold. In terms of syste
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domestic policy arena, the split is
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At the second echelon of power, Kim
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D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kenna
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about things that affect their care
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(ID) and External Liaison (ELD) dep
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For the rest of the North Korean le
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the focus for not only a significan
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At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
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There is little doubt that one of t
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decision-making process. Moreover,
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III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
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greater access to first-hand inform
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The first question addressed by thi
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But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
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as the 1950s. 16 The security organ
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Another way to look at divisions wi
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Because the Kim regime governs acco
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guess is that anyone who rises in t
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But even though the media serve as
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Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
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motivation in its readers through m
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Page 2: • Kim Jong-suk’s develo
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This selection of news items presen
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in the wake of the U.S. propaganda
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the general audience in a two-step
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also countries surrounding the Kore
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that the war in Iraq was “a test
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and transform us internally through
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eceived with little thought and has
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outside world than the ordinary wor
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cognitive dissonance, particular ca
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IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The North Korean
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A. BETTER, MERRIER, MORE HOPEFUL LI
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In contrast, the optimists believe
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to the throne. The State Council us
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1976-1977, 4 and in 1986-1987 (see
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Bulgarian Trade Unions, after which
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Second, the principal objective of
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southward expansion, and, last but
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controlling some of North Korea’s
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also against the second-tier family
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Kim Sung-ae, who is Kim Il Sung’s
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“National Security Establishment
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October 1980. Many of them (Yon Hyo
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severe draught in 1988 and the dram
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The advent of the “Songun Era”
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IV-30
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Bearing in mind Kim Jong Il’s rec
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Table IV-2. Composition of the Nort
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Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA R
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Eastern Europe. That was reportedly
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Table IV-5. Leading Ideologues Insi
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Page 214 and 215: Song Sok Hwan Vice-Minister Cha Sun
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Page 220 and 221: Northern security, military, and pa
Page 223: APPENDIX B TONGIL STREET FREE MARKE
Page 227: V. REACHING INTO NORTH KOREA DAVID
Page 231 and 232: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Korea is no
Page 233: message right to Kim Jong-il, and m
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Page 238 and 239: Society is divided into three broad
Page 240 and 241: contradictions.” 17 This makes se
Page 242 and 243: Internet is not specifically mentio
Page 244 and 245: led to a training program for young
Page 246 and 247: North Korea’s exports from legiti
Page 248 and 249: een the biggest buyers of ivory ove
Page 250 and 251: worker who travels throughout North
Page 252 and 253: If we want to reach into North Kore
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Page 258 and 259: There are a host of other things on
Page 261 and 262: Each of the five papers in this col
Page 263 and 264: promotions) and punishments (e.g.,
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Page 267 and 268: cultural rules.” Given the “str
Page 269: Speaking of Kim, whom does he consu
Page 273: Terms of Reference: North Korean Po
Page 277 and 278: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an intern
Page 279: APPENDIX C ASIAN VIEWS OF NORTH KOR
Page 282 and 283: In any case, the reforms provide a
Page 284 and 285: View from Seoul The single most imp
Page 287: Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION
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