North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

decision-making process. Moreover, because Kim Chong-il’s ruling style encourages rivalry
among his officials, personal and professional jealousies sometimes develop into attritional
recriminations between competing bureaucracies and key officials. Lack of close coordination
among the concerned parties deprives public policies of coherence, continuity, and direction.
Should such practices accumulate, the overall effectiveness of state policies will be substantially
eroded, thus eventually undermining the legitimacy of the regime. 84
System Vulnerabilities
Many of the vulnerabilities of the North Korean system reside with the elite. It is a class
that for decades has been insulated from the horrors that are experienced throughout the country.
As the North Korean economy has deteriorated, many elites have opened trading companies to
earn foreign currency. This in turn has led to increasing corruption and weakening of the
cohesion of the privileged class. Since the North Korean system is based on “feudal service
nobility,” where loyalty is ensured through privilege, if the regime loses its ability to placate the
elite through goods and services, there is a real chance of the creation of factions. 85 At first these
factions will compete with each other for the ever-declining privileges; if the situation persists,
this factionalism could transform itself into centers of opposition to the regime.
Another weakness results from the graft and corruption within the security apparatus. As
ideological faith and their devotion to the revolution and its leader are weakened within the
Praetorian Guard, Kim Chong-il will increasingly require the means to buy the loyalty that faith
and devotion no longer inspire. If he lacks the resources to buy this loyalty, he must allow the
cadre to engage in the irregular and corrupt to ensure their survival. Naturally, members of the
security services have a special advantage because they are in charge of monitoring and checking
such activities. Thus, when the agency responsible for enforcing loyalty itself becomes corrupt
and, therefore, less controllable, fault lines are created in the system. And, thus looms the
prospect of increasing corruption and systemic loss of balance, with concomitant consequences
for both the viability of the regime and the “rationality” of its leader.
84 Ken Gause, The North Korean Leadership: Evolving Regime Dynamics in the Kim Chong-il Era. Alexandria, VA:
The CNA Corporation, September 2003.
85 At times, cracks have been rumored to exist within Kim Chong-il’s core constituency. In the late 1990s, such
stalwart supporters as Kim Kuk-tae, Kim Ki-nam, and Kim Yong-sun were rumored to be frustrated by lack of
influence and access, when Kim Chong-il tended not to accept policy proposals they made. Nothing much seemed
to materialize from this discontent; however, it did reveal that as the system came under increasing economic and
political pressure, cracks could appear even within Kim Chong-il’s inner sanctum.
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