North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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Table IV-2. Composition of the North Korean “Old Guard” Name Year of Birth Position Kim Yong Nam 39 1925 President of the SPA Presidium Cho Myong-rok 1924 Director of the KPA General Political Department Pak Song Chol 1913 Honorary Vice-President of the SPA Presidium Kim Yong-ju 1920 Honorary Vice-President of the SPA Presidium, Kim Il Sung’s younger brother Kim Yong-ch’un 1922 Chief of the KPA General Staff Han Song Ryong 1923 WPK Politburo Member Kye Ung Thae 1925 WPK Politburo Member Ri Yong-mu 1924 Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission Ri Ul-Sol (retired in 1920 Marshal, former Minister of State Security Agency 2003) Paek Hak Rim 1918 Vice-Marshal, former Minister of the People’s Security (retired in March 2003) Kim Ch’ol-man (retired in 2003) 1918 Full General, Former Chairman of the Second Economic Committee Yang Hyong-sop 1925 Vice-President of the SPA Presidium, Kim Il Sung’s relative Hong Sok-hyung 1924 SPA Presidium Kim Guk-tae 1924 WPK CC Secretary, Chief of the Cadres Department Kim Jung-rin 40 1924 WPK CC Secretary (Mass Organizations) Kim Yun-hyok 1926 Secretary-General of the SPA Presidium Although some representatives of the “old guard” still occupy important positions at the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the 11th SPA in general is a relatively middleaged, university-educated, civilian technocrat-dominated, and professionally oriented expertdriven institution comprising the North Korean intellectual elite, with little military representation, despite the era of Songun politics. As a matter of fact, on August 3, 2003, out of 687 deputies, 340 deputies were elected for the first time, which means that 51% of the 10th SPA deputies were replaced with new people at the 11th SPA. Moreover, 52% of them are younger than the age of 50, including fourteen SPA deputies, probably some of the off-spring of the current DPRK leaders, who are younger than the age of 35. Such a drastic revamping and rejuvenation of the SPA deputy corps and top ranks of the Cabinet of Ministers led some observers to brand the newly elected and appointed third-generation leaders of the DPRK as the “2003 group.” 39 Kim Yong Nam is said to be a rather cunning and cautious politician, who always hesitates to make principled decisions on his own. He is known to prefer to sit on the fence and wait until the dust settles before he makes his own moves. 40 Kim Jung-rin is known to be a sullen and uncommunicative individual who chain smokes cigarettes and only listens to his counterpart, but rarely speaks. IV-34
“Technocrats” The “technocrats,” who tend to have technical backgrounds and who have been exposed to overseas policy innovations, are traditionally located within the central economic apparatus, including the Cabinet of Ministers and various central economic ministries, agencies, and commissions loaded with younger economists. Some of the “chiefs” among technocrats may be conservative, but most of the “indians” tend to be rather pragmatic and progressive in their policy views. The “technocrats” also aggregate the views of the new entrepreneurs and corporate elites, especially the former “red directorate” from about a hundred of the most important industrial combines and commercial enterprises that constitute the backbone of the DPRK’s industry, agriculture, and service sector, including banking, construction, and commerce. Table 3 lists the key representatives of the “technocrat” establishment in North Korea. Table IV-3. North Korea’s “Technocrats” within the Cabinet of Ministers Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA Premier Hong Song-nam Pak Pong-ju Vice Premier Cho Ch’ang-dok Kwak Pom-gi Vice Premier Kwak Pom-gi No Tu-ch’ol Vice Premier Sin Il-nam Chon Sung-hun State Planning 41 Pak Nam-gi 42 Kim Kwang-Rin Electric & Coal Industry 43 O Kwang-hung Chu Tong-il Mining Industries Son Chong-ho Yi Kwang-nam Metal Machine Industry Chon Sung-hun 44 Kim Sung-hyon Electronic Industries O Su-yong Construction Materials Industry Cho Yun-hui Cho Yun-hui 41 For instance, in an interview with the “People’s Korea” on April 1, 2003, Choi Hong-kyu, a reformist bureau chief under the State Planning Commission, discussed the efforts of his bureau to develop an indicative “three-year plan to solve fuel and energy problems.” If that plan were to succeed in its desired goals, it would open a way for the resumption of longer-term economic planning of broader economic and social developments in the country. 42 Prior to that, Pak Nam-gi served as the Chairman of the Administrative Committee of Pyongyang City. 43 In 2003, the General Bureau of Coal Industry (referred to as GBCI) under the Ministry of Electric and Coal Industry implemented a major industry-wide restructuring, including a massive raise in miners’ wages on average up to 15,000 Won per month, expansion of an individual progressive contract work system, and development of 230 quasi-privatized small and mid-sized mines. It also supervised the restructuring and normalization of mine output at the large-scale Bukchang and Deokcheon Coal Mining Enterprises and Ranam Coal Mining Union Enterprise. In sum, due to the GBCI-led restructuring in the mining sector, coal output was reportedly increased by 257,000 tons in 2003 as compared to 2002, which partially alleviated the shortage of energy resources exacerbated by the KEDO cutoff of the HFO deliveries to the DPRK in December 2002. 44 Minister Chon Sung-hun led an expert-level ministerial delegation to Russia and China to study the experience of industry-wide restructuring in the Russian and Chinese machine-building sectors during the market transition and explore ways to resume inter-industry cooperation between the DPRK’s leading machine-building enterprises, especially the Ryongsong Machine-building Complex and Huichon Machine-building Combine, and their traditional Russian and Chinese counterparts in July 2003. IV-35
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
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To write accurately about North Kor
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technocrats, provincial and county
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PREFACE This paper will examine in
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ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
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information streams, and from him t
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within the hands of a few individua
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and whether or not he will embarras
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to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
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strengthening of all armed forces,
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esearch institutes and “think tan
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The primary missions of the Reconna
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communication that generally fall o
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of the State Security Department or
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maintaining strict control over the
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agencies in the ROK and Japan began
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The Guard and Security Commands, wh
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eports that are funneled up through
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Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
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Within the military, this dynamic c
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him that all significant orders and
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Until the 1990s, the electronic med
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
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TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
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The factional struggles in North Ko
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A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
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C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
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document control bureaus in each mi
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Originally implemented in 1994 and
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Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
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of associates who trace their relat
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September 9, 2003, showed a change
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Chart II-2: Secretariat 5. Kye Ung-
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Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
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Table II-6. Kim Chong-il’s Princi
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Table II-7. Kim Chong-il’s Person
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chance to unfold. In terms of syste
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domestic policy arena, the split is
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At the second echelon of power, Kim
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D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kenna
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about things that affect their care
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(ID) and External Liaison (ELD) dep
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For the rest of the North Korean le
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the focus for not only a significan
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At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
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There is little doubt that one of t
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decision-making process. Moreover,
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III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
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greater access to first-hand inform
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The first question addressed by thi
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But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
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as the 1950s. 16 The security organ
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Another way to look at divisions wi
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Because the Kim regime governs acco
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guess is that anyone who rises in t
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But even though the media serve as
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Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
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motivation in its readers through m
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Page 2: • Kim Jong-suk’s develo
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This selection of news items presen
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in the wake of the U.S. propaganda
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the general audience in a two-step
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also countries surrounding the Kore
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Page 152 and 153: eceived with little thought and has
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Page 159: IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
Page 163 and 164: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The North Korean
Page 165 and 166: A. BETTER, MERRIER, MORE HOPEFUL LI
Page 167 and 168: In contrast, the optimists believe
Page 169 and 170: to the throne. The State Council us
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Page 181 and 182: also against the second-tier family
Page 183 and 184: Kim Sung-ae, who is Kim Il Sung’s
Page 185 and 186: “National Security Establishment
Page 187 and 188: October 1980. Many of them (Yon Hyo
Page 189 and 190: severe draught in 1988 and the dram
Page 192 and 193: The advent of the “Songun Era”
Page 194 and 195: IV-30
Page 196 and 197: Bearing in mind Kim Jong Il’s rec
Page 200 and 201: Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA R
Page 202 and 203: Eastern Europe. That was reportedly
Page 204 and 205: Table IV-5. Leading Ideologues Insi
Page 206 and 207: Table IV-7. Regional Origins of Top
Page 208 and 209: “Foreign Wind” The “foreign w
Page 210 and 211: Table IV-10. Some of the Most Influ
Page 212 and 213: Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
Page 214 and 215: Song Sok Hwan Vice-Minister Cha Sun
Page 216 and 217: Table IV-13. Korean-American “Int
Page 218 and 219: content and government monitoring.
Page 220 and 221: Northern security, military, and pa
Page 223: APPENDIX B TONGIL STREET FREE MARKE
Page 227: V. REACHING INTO NORTH KOREA DAVID
Page 231 and 232: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Korea is no
Page 233: message right to Kim Jong-il, and m
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Page 238 and 239: Society is divided into three broad
Page 240 and 241: contradictions.” 17 This makes se
Page 242 and 243: Internet is not specifically mentio
Page 244 and 245: led to a training program for young
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een the biggest buyers of ivory ove
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worker who travels throughout North
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If we want to reach into North Kore
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conversations with the correct mix
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Although the future of cellular tel
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There are a host of other things on
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Each of the five papers in this col
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promotions) and punishments (e.g.,
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although presumably all calls are m
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cultural rules.” Given the “str
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Speaking of Kim, whom does he consu
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Terms of Reference: North Korean Po
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Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an intern
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APPENDIX C ASIAN VIEWS OF NORTH KOR
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In any case, the reforms provide a
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View from Seoul The single most imp
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