- Page 1 and 2: INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
- Page 3: INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
- Page 9: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
- Page 12 and 13: Joe Bermudez, the preeminent open-s
- Page 15: I. INFORMATION AND THE DPRK’S MIL
- Page 19: CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS ............
- Page 23 and 24: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY As with any natio
- Page 25 and 26: A. THE MILITARY AND THE POWER-HOLDI
- Page 27 and 28: Contrary to popular belief, it is h
- Page 29 and 30: greater opportunities to travel, ne
- Page 31 and 32: National Defense Commission 6 As of
- Page 33 and 34: Ministry of People’s Armed Forces
- Page 35 and 36: The office of CCSKA is responsible
- Page 37 and 38: The Ministry of Public Security fun
- Page 39 and 40: Kim Chong-il and the military and p
- Page 41 and 42: purchased on the black market. More
- Page 43 and 44: these entities, it is used to prepa
- Page 45 and 46: produced by the MPAF’s Guard and
- Page 47 and 48: access over the past ten years has
- Page 49 and 50: A distinct aspect of diplomatic com
- Page 51 and 52: threatened to employ nuclear weapon
- Page 53 and 54: D. SUMMARY Simply stated, all power
- Page 55 and 56: APPENDIX I-A: DPRK PRINT AND ELECTR
- Page 57:
Many people who live in cities and
- Page 61 and 62:
CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........
- Page 63 and 64:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This study offers
- Page 65:
Legitimacy Kim Chong-il has already
- Page 68 and 69:
interests? Do factions, to the exte
- Page 70 and 71:
odies by organizing meeting agendas
- Page 72 and 73:
This vision came into conflict with
- Page 74 and 75:
leader, and an individualized congl
- Page 76 and 77:
oth in the Politburo and as a vice
- Page 78 and 79:
Table II-4. Illustrative Relationsh
- Page 80 and 81:
answer. One method of identifying k
- Page 82 and 83:
1. Chang Song-taek 5. Chi Chae-ryon
- Page 84 and 85:
een severely curtailed. 16 Kim Chon
- Page 86 and 87:
personal apparatus. The source of m
- Page 88 and 89:
Factions Providing in depth analysi
- Page 90 and 91:
There are several ways of looking a
- Page 92 and 93:
corruption. 38 Table II-8. Factiona
- Page 94 and 95:
Implications for North Korean Polic
- Page 96 and 97:
was apparently tapping phones of ot
- Page 98 and 99:
communications and ensuring his abi
- Page 100 and 101:
Department Operations Department Un
- Page 102 and 103:
subject headings, including South K
- Page 104 and 105:
Name Position Education Remarks Kim
- Page 106 and 107:
Below are some of the general tradi
- Page 108 and 109:
Legitimacy From a structural point
- Page 110 and 111:
Warlordism While the evidence of ex
- Page 113:
CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........
- Page 116 and 117:
discuss and argue among themselves.
- Page 119 and 120:
A. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS As a
- Page 121 and 122:
only person with “real power,”
- Page 123 and 124:
world events. It might also be assu
- Page 125 and 126:
No known political divisions among
- Page 127 and 128:
Whatever political power Kim fails
- Page 129 and 130:
How is power used to make policy de
- Page 131 and 132:
complex tools and a larger staff to
- Page 133 and 134:
According to a KCBS scriptwriter wh
- Page 135 and 136:
is the environment: “Let’s Buil
- Page 137 and 138:
For comparison purposes, here are t
- Page 139 and 140:
Korean Central Broadcasting Station
- Page 141 and 142:
operates several “gray” radio s
- Page 143 and 144:
Chinese who come to gamble in Chine
- Page 145 and 146:
appeared regularly in the latter ha
- Page 147 and 148:
ilateral discussions on the DPRK’
- Page 149 and 150:
the details of their material life
- Page 151 and 152:
people from fully processing new in
- Page 153 and 154:
with a fool for a president; 102 an
- Page 155 and 156:
ationally process it and draw reaso
- Page 157:
in the former Soviet bloc were like
- Page 161:
CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........
- Page 164 and 165:
The four pillars of the traditional
- Page 166 and 167:
Life is getting merrier, too (see A
- Page 168 and 169:
B. PATH DEPENDENCE, CRITICAL JUNCTU
- Page 170 and 171:
Central People’s Committee (CPC),
- Page 172 and 173:
National Defense Commission, follow
- Page 174 and 175:
policy began to loosen up. Party an
- Page 176 and 177:
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), (7)
- Page 178 and 179:
on top in the power struggle within
- Page 180 and 181:
he appears to favor the younger son
- Page 182 and 183:
Chang Chon Hwan was accused of symp
- Page 184 and 185:
work, monitor their communications,
- Page 186 and 187:
Table IV-1. Composition of the Nati
- Page 188 and 189:
channeling all his decisions throug
- Page 190:
North Korean regime decided to weat
- Page 193 and 194:
Kwon Hui Gyong, the DPRK Hero, was
- Page 195 and 196:
The Operation Command Group of the
- Page 197 and 198:
for key civilian management positio
- Page 199 and 200:
“Technocrats” The “technocrat
- Page 201 and 202:
It is noteworthy that in the past t
- Page 203 and 204:
Table IV-4. Educational Background
- Page 205 and 206:
These leaders are very sensitive to
- Page 207 and 208:
Table IV-8. Major National Public O
- Page 209 and 210:
Name Jo Ryong Hyon Nam Sung U Table
- Page 211 and 212:
Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
- Page 213 and 214:
Name Organization Position Ro Tu Ch
- Page 215 and 216:
Table IV-12. Some of the Most Impor
- Page 217 and 218:
Jong Yun-hyong Flood Damage Reconst
- Page 219 and 220:
ombardment and military occupation
- Page 221:
APPENDIX A FREE MARKET IN RAJIN (16
- Page 225:
APPENDIX C COMPUTER LAB AT THE PEOP
- Page 229:
CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........
- Page 232 and 233:
interesting developments include a
- Page 235 and 236:
The most reliable method of topplin
- Page 237 and 238:
The Kims rule with a heavy dose of
- Page 239 and 240:
speak of divisions instead of group
- Page 241 and 242:
Seoul newspaper goes on to describe
- Page 243 and 244:
security agents are peppered among
- Page 245 and 246:
more susceptible because they are m
- Page 247 and 248:
About 40 percent of the heroin, met
- Page 249 and 250:
Like the illicit diplomats, Bureau
- Page 251 and 252:
a province of North Korea. “Think
- Page 253 and 254:
Other specific sources of informati
- Page 255 and 256:
At a time when South Korea is repor
- Page 257 and 258:
described by Kongdan Oh. Allied dip
- Page 259:
VI. CONCLUSIONS KONGDAN (KATY) OH H
- Page 262 and 263:
Depending upon how the elite are de
- Page 264 and 265:
Mansourov refers to the existence o
- Page 266 and 267:
Gause, Kim Jong-il, through his per
- Page 268 and 269:
E. INSIGHTS FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS
- Page 271:
APPENDIX A TERMS OF REFERENCE
- Page 275:
APPENDIX B BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES
- Page 278 and 279:
Ambassador David J. Smith is Chief
- Page 281 and 282:
The author made a trip to Tokyo, Be
- Page 283 and 284:
esolution to the North Korean nucle
- Page 285:
and behaviors. A case in point is t